Elusive Ingredient: Hamas and the Peace Process

Abstract

This essay argues that the significant shift in the political power balance in the occupied Palestinian territories toward the Islamists in recent years has major implications for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and must be taken into account if there is any chance for a successful resolution. The authors, who have first-hand involvement with conflict resolution and negotiations with Hamas, survey the movement's evolution on the ground, its participation in cease-fire and intra-Palestinian talks to date, and its positions on power accommodation with the other Palestinian factions and on eventual participation in peace talks or governance. Attention is also paid to the role of external actors in the process and the ingredients of successful peacemaking. The authors conclude that current peace frameworks, by ignoring Hamas's weight and its indications of readiness for political incorporation into peacemaking, are ignoring what could be the ““elusive ingredient”” for peace.

Brokering Peace: Networks, Legitimacy, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process1

“…From a network theory perspective, one serious problem in the Jerusalem conflict is that officials in Israel and the United States have placed a premium on negotiating only with moderates, defined as actors that have clearly denounced violence. Former president George W. Bush, for example, praised Abbas as “a voice that is a reasonable voice among the extremists in your neighborhood.” Under his administration, the US–Israeli approach aimed to weaken Hamas and strengthen Abbas and his moderate Fatah party, so they would “be strengthened to the point where they can lead the Palestinians in a different direction, with a different hope” ( Washington Post , June 20, 2007; see also Milton‐Edwards and Crooke 2004:9–51; Gunning 2008). It is completely understandable why Israel and the United States prefer to negotiate with Abbas.…”

“…For example, skeptics of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ capacity to reach a settlement rightly point to his lack of ties with Islamic nationalists, particularly the supporters of Hamas. Without these ties, he lacks the authority to deliver this important constituency (for example, Milton‐Edwards and Crooke 2004; Gunning 2008). Moreover, when networks are polarized, it is difficult to portray a settlement as legitimate to multiple audiences: different coalitions hold distinct, even mutually exclusive understandings of what constitutes a legitimate settlement.…”

Crescent and Sword: The Hamas enigma

“…These events show the limits t o negotiated settlements and have, at least temporarily, crushed the hopes for Palestinian statehood. 60 Hamas has also been weakened and suffered intense humiliation by having two of its leaders (and founders) killed within weeks of each other. The deadly accuracy of the attacks supports claims that the attackers have been aided by Palestinian informers about the exact whereabouts of the victims.…”

Norway’s ambiguous approach towards Israel and Palestine

“…However, there was no recognition of Israel as an occupier. Furthermore, there was no "reference to the Palestinian right to self-determination or statehood" (Abu Amr, 1994, p. 78) in the Accords confirming that these accords were never meant to bring about a sovereign State of Palestine (Milton-Edwards & Alastair, 2004;Pace & Sen, in press;Persson, 2010).…”