Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions

Lagunoff, Roger

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.002

Cited by 39 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 32 publications

(31 reference statements)

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“…Penn [42] considers a dynamic voting game with randomly generated policy proposals and probabilistic voting on these proposals. Lagunoff [36,35] investigates a class of stochastic games that incorporate a social choice solution concept and analyzes endogenous political institutions. Finally, Gomez and Jehiel [29] consider a class of stochastic games and characterize efficiency properties of equilibrium when players are patient.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic legislative policy making

Duggan

Kalandrakis

2012

Journal of Economic Theory

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic legislative policy making

Duggan

Kalandrakis

2012

Journal of Economic Theory

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“…The perspective of institutional change can be used to describe the changing nature of the FNC and its development over the past two decades. It can explain the impact of external and internal factors that promote continuous change in the oversight powers of MPs (Capoccia, 2016a; Lagunoff, 2009; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Therefore, the changes that occur within the FNC can be understood as legitimately building legislative capacity that are natural phases of the life cycle of institutions (Greif & Laitin, 2004).…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Parliamentary questions, institutional change, and legislative oversight in a non‐Western context

Aboelwafa,

Yaghi

2024

Politics & Policy

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This study examines how the Federal National Council (FNC), the parliament of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), transformed from a consultative body to a legislative institution through gradual and incremental changes. It argues that the increasing number of parliamentary questions led to legal, procedural, and behavioral changes in the FNC, influenced by external (government support and public pressure) and internal (rationality, competence, incrementalism, and system development) factors. The success of this transformation is attributed to its gradual nature. Anticipating continued momentum, the study outlines future prospects shaped by the UAE government's commitment to FNC empowerment, heightened public expectations, and the influx of educated and experienced individuals into parliamentary roles. This ongoing institutional change reflects a responsive adaptation to evolving governance demands in the UAE. The study contributes to the theory of institutions and the understanding of legislative oversight in newly liberalized political systems.Related ArticlesAntwi‐Boateng, Osman, and Noura Hamad Salim Al Jaberi. 2022. “The Post‐Oil Strategy of the UAE: An Examination of Diversification Strategies and Challenges.” Politics & Policy 50(2): 380–407. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12457.Jouini, Nizar, and Manel Ben Akal. 2022. “Political Consensus, Economic Reforms, and Democratic Transitions in the Middle East: Evidence from Voting on Tunisian Reform Bills.” Politics & Policy 50(4): 851–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12489.Sarquís, David J. 2012. “Democratization after the Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt's Political Transition.” Politics & Policy 40(5): 871–903. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00381.x.

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“…Barberà, Maschler, and Shalev (2001) study a dynamic game of club formation in which any member of the club can admit a new agent unilaterally. 5 Lagunoff (2009), who constructs a general model of political reform and relates reform to the time inconsistency of induced social rules, is another precursor. The analyses of franchise extension in Robinson (2000, 2006) and Lizzeri and Persico (2004), and the model of constitutional stability in Barberà and Jackson (2004), are also related and can be cast as applications of our general framework.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs

Acemoğlu

Egorov

Sonin

2012

American Economic Review

115

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Consider the problem of a society choosing its constitution. Naturally, the current rewards from adopting a specific constitution will influence this decision. Yet, as long as the members of the society are forward-looking and patient, the future implications of the constitution may be even more important. For example, a constitution that encourages economic activity and benefits the majority of the population may nonetheless lead to future instability or leave room for a minority to seize political control. If so, the society-or the majority of its members-may rationally shy away from adopting such a constitution. Many problems in political economy, club theory, coalition formation, organizational economics, and industrial organization have a structure resembling this example of constitutional choice.We develop a tractable framework for the analysis of dynamic collective decisions. Consider a society consisting of a finite number of infinitely lived individuals. It starts in a particular state. A state in our framework represents both economic and political arrangements. In particular, it determines stage payoffs (for example, by shaping economic allocations) and also how the society can determine its future states (e.g., which subsets of individuals can change the economic allocations andIn dynamic collective decision making, current decisions determine the future distribution of political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this class of problems. Under acyclicity, we characterize dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and obtain two general insights. First, a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently powerful groups. Second, efficiency-enhancing changes may be resisted because of further changes they will engender. We use this framework to analyze dynamics of political rights in a society with different types of extremist views. (JEL D71, D72, K10)

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Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions

Cited by 39 publications

References 32 publications

Dynamic legislative policy making

Dynamic legislative policy making

Parliamentary questions, institutional change, and legislative oversight in a non‐Western context

Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs

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