Dynamic legislative policy making

Duggan, John; Kalandrakis, Tasos

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.015

Cited by 99 publications

(68 citation statements)

References 39 publications

(78 reference statements)

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“…Duggan and Kalandrakis (2012) use a fixed point argument to establish existence of pure strategy SMPEs for games with any quota in which preferences and the default are subject to stochastic shocks. 9 By contrast, we prove existence in unperturbed games (by and large) using constructive arguments.…”

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confidence: 99%

Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1

Anesi

Seidmann

2015

Review of Economic Studies

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Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This paper studies an extension of the Baron-Ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees: In each of an infinite number of periods, the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy (which is, in turn, the default for the next period). The model provides a number of quite different predictions. (i) From a positive perspective, the key distinction turns on whether the quota is less than unanimity. In that case, patient enough players waste substantial shares of the pie each period and the size principle fails in some pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria. By contrast, the unique Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs in a unanimity committee coincide with those in the corresponding Baron-Ferejohn framework. (ii) If players have heterogeneous discount factors then a large class of subgame perfect equilibria (including all Markov perfect equilibria) are inefficient.JEL classification: C73, C78, D71, D72.

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confidence: 99%

Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1

Anesi

Seidmann

2015

Review of Economic Studies

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“…Assuming a finite set of alternatives and veto players (or a persistent agenda setter), we obtain necessary conditions for equilibrium ergodic sets that do not rely on constructive techniques and that permit a full characterization of equilibrium absorbing points (provided that players are sufficiently patient). In a framework that assumes a general voting rule and general (finite or infinite) set of alternatives, Duggan and Kalandrakis (2012) provide conditions under which every stationary Markov perfect equilibrium determines an aperiodic transition over policies, with fast convergence from any given initial policy to an ergodic distribution (that can depend on the starting point), and this ergodicity result holds in our finite framework as well, in light of wellknown results on finite-state Markov chains. Those authors can also obtain uniqueness of the ergodic distribution, but that result relies on the presence of shocks to the status quo each period.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players

Anesi

Duggan

2017

Games and Economic Behavior

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This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probability, a set of alternatives corresponds to the absorbing points of an equilibrium if and only if it is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. We also apply our analysis of ergodic properties of equilibria to the persistent agenda setter environment of Diermeier and Fong (2012). We show that all equilibria are essentially pure, and we extend their characterization of absorbing sets to allow an arbitrary voting rule and by removing the restriction to pure strategy equilibira.

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“…E¤ectively, the Byrd Rule requires a higher majority to raise the budget de…cit than to lower it, since curbing the de…cit was its main rationale. 28 However, the game-theoretic logic highlighted in this model suggests that with an endogenous status quo, this rule might have unintended consequences. Fiscally expansionist legislators may be unwilling to reduce the budget de…cit in good times, realizing that the Byrd rule will make it more di¢ cult to increase it in the future.…”

Section: Biased Voting Rulesmentioning

confidence: 96%

Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo

Dziuda

Loeper

2013

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In a legislative setting, this model shows that the inertial e¤ect of the endogenous status quo can be mitigated by concentrating decision power, and can be eliminated by sunset provisions. JEL Classi…cation Numbers: C73, D72, D78 Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Dynamic legislative policy making

Cited by 99 publications

References 39 publications

Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1

Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1

Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players

Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo

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