Duopoly signal jamming

Mirman, Leonard J.; Samuelson, Larry; Urbano, Amparo

doi:10.1007/bf01213697

Cited by 31 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Other research takes the opposite tack of exploring how actions are affected when firms have incentives to manipulate beliefs of rivals in symmetric information settings. The signal-jamming literature (Riordan, 1985;Aghion et al, 1991;Mirman, Samuelson, and Urbano, 1993;Caminal and Vives, 1996;Alepuz and Urbano, 2005;Harrington, 1995) explores belief manipulation incentives when firms learn about the level of demand from prices. In these two-date models, firms are symmetrically uninformed about demand or costs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The signal-jamming literature (Riordan 1985, Aghion et al 1991, Mirman et al 1993, Caminal and Vives 1996, or Harrington 1996 highlights how firms over-produce on common-value public information-firm outputs weight public common demand by more than they would in a full information setting-to try to persuade rivals via their price signals that the market is less profitable. But what about privately-observed shocks?…”

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confidence: 99%

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Learning about common and private values in oligopoly

Bernhardt

Taub

2015

The RAND J of Economics

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We characterize a duopoly buffeted by demand and cost shocks. Firms learn about shocks from common observation, private observation, and noisy price signals. Firms internalize how outputs affect a rival's signal, and hence output. We distinguish how the nature of informationpublic versus private-and of what firms learn about-common versus private values-affect equilibrium outcomes. Firm outputs weigh private information about private values by more than common values. Thus, prices contain more information about private-value shocks. * We thank Marco Ottaviani for helpful comments.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Learning about common and private values in oligopoly

Bernhardt

Taub

2015

The RAND J of Economics

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“…Kirman (1975), Aghion et al (1993), Mirman et al (1993b), Harrington (1995), Bergemann and Valimaki (1996), Alepuz and Urbano (1999), Rassenti et al (2000), Belleflamme and Bloch (2001), Schinkel et al (2002), Keller and Rady (2003), Dimitrova and Schlee (2003), Tuinstra (2004). One usually assumes that firms are using a certain specific learning scheme, and then studies whether the selling prices converge to a Nash equilibrium.…”

Section: Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic pricing and learning: Historical origins, current research, and new directions

Boer

2015

Surveys in Operations Research and Management Science

294

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Dynamic pricing and learning is a research topic that has received a considerable amount of attention in recent years, from different scientific communities: operations research and management science, marketing, economics, econometrics, and computer science. We survey these literature streams: we provide a brief introduction to the historical origins of quantitative research on pricing and demand estimation, point to different subfields in the area of dynamic pricing, and provide an in-depth overview of the available literature on dynamic pricing and learning. We discuss relations with methodologically related research areas, and identify several important directions for future research.

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“…Suppose that u y is the value function of the symmetric equilibrium X y . Combining (17), (18) and ( Suppose now that u y is a bounded solution of (20), and put X y = T (uy) N . Then, reversing the argument of the previous paragraph, we see that (21) holds.…”

Section: Strategic Experimentation: the Discounted Casementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, Bhattacharya, Chatterjee and Samuelson [5] consider a game of strategic research and development. Mirman, Samuelson and Urbano [18] consider a game of duopoly signal jamming in which the experiments of one player partly serve the purpose of confusing the other player. Rob [19] studies a game of entry with unknown market size.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Experimentation: a Revision

Bolton

Harris

1997

SSRN Journal

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This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which I players each face the same experimentation problem. The main change from the single-agent problem is that an agent can now learn from the current experimentation of other agents. Information is therefore a public good, and a freerider problem in experimentation naturally arises. More interestingly, the prospect of future experimentation by others encourages agents to increase current experimentation, in order to bring forward the We w ould like to thank the Studienzentrum, Gerzensee, where a substantial part of the work reported in this paper was undertaken.

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Duopoly signal jamming

Cited by 31 publications

References 18 publications

Learning about common and private values in oligopoly

Learning about common and private values in oligopoly

Dynamic pricing and learning: Historical origins, current research, and new directions

Strategic Experimentation: a Revision

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