Dualism and its place in a philosophical structure for psychiatry

Abstract

It is often claimed in parts of the psychiatric literature that neuroscientific research into the biological basis of mental disorder undermines dualism in the philosophy of mind. This paper shows that such a claim does not apply to all forms of dualism. Focusing on Kenneth Kendler's discussion of the mind-body problem in biological psychiatry, I argue that such criticism of dualism often conflates the psychological and phenomenal concepts of the mental. Moreover, it fails to acknowledge that there are different varieties of dualism, and so overlooks the important metaphysical insights of contemporary dualist philosophers. I argue that while the neuroscientific research underpinning biological psychiatry challenges the traditional dualism of René Descartes, it does not pose any problem for the more modern dualism of David Chalmers. It is possible to take seriously the scientific claims of biological psychiatry while holding that this latter form of dualism is true. This has implications for the positioning of the mind-body problem in psychiatry. While the "easy" problem of explaining psychological processes is relevant to the aims of biological psychiatry, psychiatrists need not worry about the "hard" problem of consciousness.

Medicine’s metaphysical morass: how confusion about dualism threatens public health

“…In 2018, Hane Maung followed up on Cooper’s conclusion with a substantial defense for naturalistic dualism as a “a way of maintaining the irreducibility of subjective experience while accepting the scientific claims of biological psychiatry” (Maung 2019 , p. 68). In “Dualism and its place in a philosophical structure for psychiatry” (Maung 2019 ), Maung presents the tenets of naturalistic dualism as defended by Chalmers in a way that finally does refute knee-jerk resistance to dualism in psychiatry.…”

“…Second, naturalistic dualism is motivated by “the perceived failure of physicalism to account for the subjective experience of consciousness” (Maung 2019 , p. 63). Chalmers asks, How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion?…”

Striking the balance with epistemic injustice in healthcare: the case of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis

“…Taking these descriptions to be clear evidence of negative stereotyping is suggestive of the idea that the relevant injustices can be prevented by simply confronting the attitudes of the medical professionals in question. It is problematic to attribute negative 5 Identifying this particular dualistic view of illness as problematic does not necessarily undermine the entire project of philosophical dualism in all of its forms; this deserves careful exploration elsewhere (see Maung 2019). 6 I thank an anonymous referee for the comment that some consider CFS/ME to be a socially constructed condition.…”

“… 5 Identifying this particular dualistic view of illness as problematic does not necessarily undermine the entire project of philosophical dualism in all of its forms; this deserves careful exploration elsewhere (see Maung 2019 ). …”

Quantum Physics Perspective on Electromagnetic and Quantum Fields Inside the Brain

“…Those suffering from psychiatric disorders or psychosis spectrum disorders, QF is probably a better energy that should be studied in them. It is because of oneness or wholeness concept for QF; any fragmentation in this onefield (loss from reality) likely causes psychotic-like manifestation (9,10). Noteworthy, more symmetry and lower frequency waves features of QF may be utilised in making diagnosis and monitoring for psychiatric disorders.…”