Dreaming of a stable world: vision and action in sleep

Rosen, Melanie

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02149-1

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 96 publications

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“…2 Versions of the hallucination model can be found in Descartes (1984), Hobson et al (2003) and Revonsuo (2005). Alternatives to hallucination and imagination accounts include the view that dreams involve neither perceptual or imaginative experiences but are sui-generis immersive spatio-temporal hallucinations (Windt 2010(Windt , 2015, and the pluralist thesis that dreams essentially involve multiple different kinds of experience (Rosen 2012(Rosen , 2019.…”

Section: The Imagination Model Of Dreamingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming

Whiteley

2020

Philos Stud

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Aphantasia is a recently discovered disorder characterised by the total incapacity to generate visual forms of mental imagery. This paper proposes that aphantasia raises important theoretical concerns for the ongoing debate in the philosophy and science of consciousness over the nature of dreams. Recent studies of aphantasia and its neurobehavioral correlates reveal that the majority of aphantasics, whilst unable to produce visual imagery while awake, nevertheless retain the capacity to experience rich visual dreams. This finding constitutes a novel explanandum for theories of dreaming. Specifically, I argue that the recent dream reports of aphantasics constitute an empirical challenge to the emerging family of views which claim that dreams are essentially imaginative experiences, constitutively involving the kinds of mental imagery which aphantasics, ex-hypothesi, lack. After presenting this challenge in the context of Jonathan Ichikawa’s recent arguments for this view, I argue that this empirical challenge may be overcome if the imagination theorist abandons Ichikawa’s account of dreaming in favour of a modified version. This involves the claim that dreams are essentially inactive and constitutively involve non voluntary forms of imagination. I conclude with a suggestion for further research which can test the viability of this alternative hypothesis, and move the debate forward.

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Section: The Imagination Model Of Dreamingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming

Whiteley

2020

Philos Stud

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“…But whether we endorse the spontaneous imagination model, the hallucination model of dreaming (Rosen, 2021;Rosen, 2018), or another model (e.g. Windt, 2020), these explanations are directed at the same observation: when we dream, we feel a sense of "phenomenal presence, " often located in or focused upon an "alter-ego" with which we identify, and in relation to which we perceive a dream environment.…”

Section: Degrees Of Immersion 2: Dreaming Vs Daydreamingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Daydreaming as spontaneous immersive imagination: A phenomenological analysis

Lawson,

Thompson

2024

PhiMiSci

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Research on the specific features of daydreaming compared with mind-wandering and night dreaming is a neglected topic in the philosophy of mind and the cognitive neuroscience of spontaneous thought. The extant research either conflates daydreaming with mind-wandering (whether understood as task-unrelated thought, unguided attention, or disunified thought), characterizes daydreaming as opposed to mind-wandering (Dorsch, 2015), or takes daydreaming to encompass any and all “imagined events” (Newby-Clark & Thavendran, 2018). These dueling definitions obstruct future research on spontaneous thought, and are insufficiently precise to guide empirical studies. They also fail to illuminate the phenomenal core of daydreaming, namely, its dreamlike qualities. Although daydreaming is related to both mind-wandering and narrative imagination, it is not reducible to either. We argue that daydreams are experiences of spontaneous, immersive imagination in the waking state. The main task of our investigation is to distinguish daydreaming, conceptually and phenomenologically, from mind-wandering, on the one hand, and night dreaming, on the other. Although daydream experiences can vary widely, we distinguish prototypical experiences of daydreaming from adjacent imaginative activity, including fleeting imagery and “focused daydreaming,” or crafted visualization. We consider our phenomenological analysis as preparatory work for conceptually distinguishing different spontaneous and imaginative states so that they can be investigated accordingly with questionnaires and qualitative methods. We argue that precision about the phenomenal character of daydreaming can guide neurophenomenological investigations, help delimit studies on individual variance in daydreaming features, and identify differences among daydreaming, mind-wandering, and night dreaming conceptually and phenomenologically, and possibly eventually in terms of neural correlates.

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“…Can we determine with any certainty, for example, that the basketball dream occurred at the same time that the vertical eye‐movements did? It is likely that the eyes track the dream scene at times, but certainly not always (Rosen ). It is also possible that eye‐movements can be generated automatically by PGO waves which then inform the dream‐eyes of movement, causing changes to the hallucinated scene (Miyauchi, Misaki, Kan, Fukunaga, & Koike, ; Ogawa, Nittono, & Hori, ; Peigneux et al, ).…”

Section: Difficult Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to operationalise consciousness

Carruthers

Carls-Diamante²,

Huang³

et al. 2019

Australian Journal of Psychology

Self Cite

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Objective: To review the way consciousness is operationalised in contemporary research, discuss strengths and weaknesses of current approaches and propose new measures. Method: We first reviewed the literature pertaining to the phenomenal character of visual and self-consciousness as well as awareness of visual stimuli. We also reviewed more problematic cases of dreams and animal consciousness, specifically that of octopuses. Results: Despite controversies, work in visual and self-consciousness is highly developed and there are notable successes. Cases where experiences are not induced, such as dreams, and where no verbal report is possible, such as when we study purported experiences of octopuses, are more challenging. It is difficult to be confident about the reliability and validity of operationalisations of dreams.Although this is a general concern about the measuring consciousness, it is not a sufficiently severe concern to completely undermine the work reviewed on vision and self-consciousness. It is more difficult to see how the good work on human psychology can be applied to non-human animals, especially those with radically different nervous systems, such as octopuses. Given the limitations of report-based operationalisations of consciousness, it is desirable to develop non-report-based measures, particularly for phenomenal qualities. We examine a number of possibilities and offer two possible approaches of varying degrees of practicality, the first based on combining quality space descriptions of phenomenal qualities and the notion of a "neural activation space" inherited from connectionist A.I., the second being a novel match to target approach. Conclusion: Consciousness is a multi-faceted phenomenon and requires a variety of operationalisations to be studied.

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Dreaming of a stable world: vision and action in sleep

Cited by 11 publications

References 96 publications

Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming

Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming

Daydreaming as spontaneous immersive imagination: A phenomenological analysis

How to operationalise consciousness

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