Double introduction of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus into France in early 2006

Evolutionary Dynamics of Multiple Sublineages of H5N1 Influenza Viruses in Nigeria from 2006 to 2008

“…This is also consistent with previous findings concerning the novel introduction into northern Nigeria of sublineage III in 2008 (13), and these findings provide additional evidence that migratory birds from Eastern/Central Europe or Russia are implicated in the introduction of HPAI H5N1 viruses into Nigeria. This is consistent with the several reports concerning the introductions into European countries of distinct sublineages of clade 2.2 HPAI H5N1 viruses through wild birds, for example, in Germany, Denmark, Hungary, France, and Italy (1,14,27,28,30). However, it is still not possible to exclude the involvement of trade of poultry and poultry products as a source of infection.…”

Reversion of PB2-627E to -627K during Replication of an H5N1 Clade 2.2 Virus in Mammalian Hosts Depends on the Origin of the Nucleoprotein

“…In different HPAIV, the presence of PB2-627K leads to high levels of virulence in experimentally infected mice, guinea pigs, and ferrets (15,19,20,32,43,45,53) and has led to fatal outcomes of several zoonotic infections in humans (8,12). In early 2006, these clade 2.2 viruses eventually emerged in Western Europe (14,35,44,61,63). A particularly large outbreak in swans (Cygnus sp.)…”

Risk factors of primary introduction of highly pathogenic and low pathogenic avian influenza virus into European poultry holdings, considering at least material contaminated by wild birds and contact with wild birds

“…This attribution was done following epidemiological investigations that excluded the presence of undetected infected poultry holdings as the source of the detected outbreak. For 14 of the reported outbreaks, the virus serotype causing the outbreak was isolated from both the affected poultry and wild birds present in the same region around the same time, with the virus isolates showing high genetic homology (Bouwstra et al, 2015b;Gall-Recule et al, 2008;Handberg et al, 2010;Lindh et al, 2014;Terregino et al, 2007;Therkildsen et al, 2011). In addition to the phylogenetic data, presence of wild birds in the proximity of the effected holdings was also reported as further evidence for some of the analysed outbreaks (Bouwstra et al, 2015b;Gall-Recule et al, 2008;Therkildsen et al, 2011).…”

“…For 14 of the reported outbreaks, the virus serotype causing the outbreak was isolated from both the affected poultry and wild birds present in the same region around the same time, with the virus isolates showing high genetic homology (Bouwstra et al, 2015b;Gall-Recule et al, 2008;Handberg et al, 2010;Lindh et al, 2014;Terregino et al, 2007;Therkildsen et al, 2011). In addition to the phylogenetic data, presence of wild birds in the proximity of the effected holdings was also reported as further evidence for some of the analysed outbreaks (Bouwstra et al, 2015b;Gall-Recule et al, 2008;Therkildsen et al, 2011). Other sources of evidence presented to support the incrimination of contact with wild birds as the source of introduction were: proximity (epidemiological evidence) (Cecchinato et al, 2010;Cherbonnel et al, 2007;Conraths et al, 2016;Iglesias et al, 2010;Manvell et al, 2008;Marche et al, 2014;Probst et al, 2012;Ward et al, 2008a;Ward et al, 2009b) or phylogenetic inference, where virus was only isolated from the affected poultry holdings and compared with sequences reported in databases such as GenBank (Alexander et al, 2010;Bragstad et al, 2007;Bragstad et al, 2005;Corrand et al, 2012;Handberg et al, 2010;Hanna et al, 2015;Marche et al, 2014;Marinova-Petkova et al, 2016;Parker et al, 2014;Reid et al, 2011;Starick et al, 2008;Szeleczky et al, 2009;Terregino et al, 2007) (Table 5).…”