Does trust extend beyond the village? Experimental trust and social distance in Cameroon

Etang, Alvin; Fielding, David; Knowles, Stephen

doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9255-3

Cited by 78 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Trust can be identified in a between-subjects design with OT using the investment and triple dictator games (Cox 2004). Within-subjects designs with PAI for multiple tasks, such as a risk game and investment game and triple dictator game (Etang et al 2011), cannot identify trust because responses are confounded by portfolio incentives. Use of PAI in such experiments should be avoided in favor of between-subjects designs and OT.…”

Section: Examples Of Experiments On Social Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paradoxes and mechanisms for choice under risk

2014

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Experiments on choice under risk typically involve multiple decisions by individual subjects. The choice of mechanism for selecting decision(s) for payoff is an essential design feature unless subjects isolate each one of the multiple decisions. We report treatments with different payoff mechanisms but the same decision tasks. The data show large differences across mechanisms in subjects' revealed risk preferences, a clear violation of isolation. We illustrate the importance of these mechanism effects by identifying their implications for classical tests of theories of decision under risk. We discuss theoretical properties of commonly used mechanisms, and new mechanisms introduced herein, in order to clarify which mechanisms are theoretically incentive compatible for which theories. We identify behavioral properties of some mechanisms that can introduce bias in elicited risk preferences-from cross-task contaminationeven when the mechanism used is theoretically incentive compatible. We explain that selection of a payoff mechanism is an important component of experimental design in many topic areas including social preferences, public goods, bargaining, and choice under uncertainty and ambiguity as well as experiments on decisions under risk.

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Section: Examples Of Experiments On Social Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paradoxes and mechanisms for choice under risk

2014

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“…If the sum of an entrepreneur's capital and private wealth is higher than his saving target he exits the angel market segment and is replaced by a random new entrepreneur. 7 11. If investors have no capital left they exit the market and are replaced by a random new investor.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

How much should an investor trust the startup entrepreneur? A network model

Klabunde

2015

J Econ Interact Coord

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“…6 Moreover, studies using either artificial (e.g., Buchan et al, 2006) or natural identities (e.g., Etang et al, 2011) have shown that in-group favoritism affects both trust and trustworthiness.…”

Section: Conceptual Framework and Conjecturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Upward Mobility Harm Trust?

Suchon,

Villeval

2018

SSRN Journal

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Abstract:While considered as appealing for positive and normative reasons, anecdotal evidence suggests that upward social mobility may harm interpersonal interactions. We report on an experiment testing the effect of upward social mobility on interpersonal trust. Individuals are characterized both by a natural group identity and by a status awarded by means of relative performance in a task in which natural identities strongly predict performance. Upward mobility is characterized by the access to the high status of individuals belonging to the natural group associated with a lower expected performance. We find that socially mobile individuals trust less than those who are not socially mobile, especially when the trustee belongs to the same natural group. In contrast, upward mobility does not affect trustworthiness. We find no evidence that interacting with an upwardly mobile individual impacts trust or trustworthiness. Keywords:Trust, trustworthiness, social mobility, social identity, experiment JEL codes:C92, J62 Does upward mobility harm trust? * Rémi Suchon† -Marie Claire Villeval ‡ January 12, 2018Abstract While considered as appealing for positive and normative reasons, anecdotal evidence suggests that upward social mobility may harm interpersonal interactions. We report on an experiment testing the effect of upward social mobility on interpersonal trust. Individuals are characterized both by a natural group identity and by a status awarded by means of relative performance in a task in which natural identities strongly predict performance. Upward mobility is characterized by the access to the high status of individuals belonging to the natural group associated with a lower expected performance. We find that socially mobile individuals trust less than those who are not socially mobile, especially when the trustee belongs to the same natural group. In contrast, upward mobility does not affect trustworthiness. We find no evidence that interacting with an upwardly mobile individual impacts trust or trustworthiness.

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Does trust extend beyond the village? Experimental trust and social distance in Cameroon

Abstract: Experiment, Trust game, Dictator game, Risk game, Social distance, Cameroon, C93, O12, Z13,

Cited by 78 publications

References 24 publications

Paradoxes and mechanisms for choice under risk

Paradoxes and mechanisms for choice under risk

How much should an investor trust the startup entrepreneur? A network model

Does Upward Mobility Harm Trust?

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