Does thought imply ought?

Bykvist, Krister; Hattiangadi, Anandi

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00691.x

Cited by 54 publications

(78 citation statements)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Generally, their objection to this norm is that it is unsatisfiable -there are infinitely many truths which not only no one cares to believe but also that no one could possibly believe, or unsuitable -there are trivial or uninteresting beliefs that are true but that no one would care to believe. Some other philosophers reject the idea of normative connection in the form (WF), even though they recognize that there is some connection between belief and truth; see, for example, Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007), Glüer andWikforss (2009), andSteglich-Petersen (2006). We will briefly outline their arguments below.…”

Section: The Normative Accountmentioning

confidence: 97%

How to Think About the Correctness of Theistic Belief

Szatkowski¹

2014

Metaphysica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Truth is a value in that sense that a belief is correct just in case it is true, which is frequently expressed in the metaphor that beliefs aim at truth. But, what does it mean to say that beliefs aim at truth? There are three most prominent approaches to this issue: purposive (or causal), teleological (or intentional), and normative. A comprehensive discussion of these approaches is the goal of our article. We also offer the hierarchy of languages and meta-languages, which gives a fragmentary account of the concept of God's omniscience.

show abstract

Section: The Normative Accountmentioning

confidence: 97%

How to Think About the Correctness of Theistic Belief

Szatkowski¹

2014

Metaphysica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For criticism, see e.g. Bykvist andHattiangadi (2007), McHugh (2012). I say more about the normative force of formal objects below, though I lack the space to address specifically this controversy about truth.…”

Section: Evaluative Acknowledgment As Appropriately Responding To Valuementioning

confidence: 99%

How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes

Müller

2017

Dialectica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the level of intentional mode or attitude (Deonna and Teroni , , ). I first argue that this proposal fails to make emotions intelligible as value apprehensions. There are reasons to suppose that emotions do not apprehend value to begin with, but are related to values in a different, non‐epistemic sense. I then go on to show that the notion of an evaluative intentional mode can still help elucidate the evaluative character of emotion. I argue that there is a plausible non‐epistemic understanding of the view that emotions are evaluative modes. On this account, emotions are not ways of apprehending values, but ways of acknowledging values.

show abstract

“…It implies that Olivia must violate RP for it to apply to her. As long as Olivia is subject to RP, Olivia infringes this requirement by not having 29 Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007) defend this principle.…”

Section: The Function Of Normative Process-requirementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Function of Normative Process-Requirements

Fink¹

2012

Dialectica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper discusses whether rationality, morality or prudence impose process‐requirements upon us. It has been argued that process‐requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process‐requirements. First, process‐requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary explanations of why a person possesses a certain degree of morality, rationality or prudence. However, I argue that these two functions are unable to show the existence of process‐requirements. Instead, I propose a different essential function for process‐requirements: they are necessary for attributing the correct degree of rationality, morality or prudence to a subject who is not entirely rational, moral or prudent. This function, I argue, necessitates the existence of process‐requirements.

show abstract

Does thought imply ought?

Cited by 54 publications

References 10 publications

How to Think About the Correctness of Theistic Belief

How to Think About the Correctness of Theistic Belief

How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes

The Function of Normative Process-Requirements

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About