Does the Fearless Phobic really fear the squeak of mice ‘too much’?

Pearson, Giles

doi:10.5840/ancientphil200626142

Cited by 25 publications

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“…In some situations it would be inappropriate to feel any anger at all, say, or any sexual desire or any fear. Pearson (2006) argues that talk of too little or too much may commit one to a misleading implication that some quantity is appropriate. For example, saying that an individual embezzled too much money would leave a misleading impression that embezzling some amount of money was appropriate.…”

Section: Temperance and Couragementioning

confidence: 99%

The Archer and Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean

Koehn¹

2013

peitho

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It is sometimes claimed that Aristotle’s doctrine of the Mean is false or unhelpful: moral virtues are not typically flanked by two opposing vices as he claimed. However, an explicit restatement of Aristotle’s view in terms of sufficiency for an objective reveals that the Mean is more widely applicable than has sometimes been alleged. Understood as a special case of sufficiency, it is essential to many judgments of right and wrong. I consider some objections by Rosalind Hursthouse to Aristotle’s theory and argue that they are based on a misunderstanding. However, there is indeed a tension in Aristotle’s view of goodness, hinted at in his claim that the good is "said in many ways".

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Section: Temperance and Couragementioning

confidence: 99%

The Archer and Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean

Koehn¹

2013

peitho

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“…The courageous person fears the right things in battle, and, according to Aristotle, there are three: death, pain, and wounds (III.6.1115a32, III.9.1117a33, III.9.1117b9). But suppose Hursthouse is what she calls a fearless phobic , that “although I fear the dark, enclosed spaces and mice, I do not fear death, pain or physical damage” (Hursthouse , 67; see also Pearson , 88, for a similar example concerning the occasions for virtue). If so, she goes wrong in a single parameter—unlike the hot‐tempered person above—by having the wrong objects, rather than too many or too few.…”

Section: Deficiencies In the Doctrinementioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, it is misleading to say that the fearless phobic exhibits excess and deficiency with respect to the amount parameter. To say that she fears mice too much is logically consistent, but it has the implicature that she should fear mice to some degree but not so much, when in fact she should not fear mice at all (Pearson , 85–86). Second, it is simpler just to say that the fearless phobic exhibits excess and deficiency with respect to the original, object , parameter.…”

Section: Deficiencies In the Doctrinementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For all we are told, the hot‐tempered person who gets more angry but at fewer things than he should may be more like the consistently irascible person than his unresponsive opposite, in which case he is excessive in his anger. And, even without being told any more, the fearless phobic is more like the truly rash person than the coward in the objects she fears, as even critics of the doctrine admit (Hursthouse , 67; Pearson , 81–2), in which case she is deficient with respect to the objects of fear. At least some people, then, are excessive or deficient overall even though they are a mixture of excess in some respects and deficiency in others.…”

Section: Making Good the Deficienciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the Quantitative Doctrine of the Mean

Mintoff¹

2013

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is expressed in quantitative terms, but this has been hard for some people to take literally, its more elaborate versions sometimes being described as "extremely silly." Roughly two books of the Nicomachean Ethics are permeated with talk of character traits which are either deficient or excessive, however, and the aim of this paper is to examine how the doctrine might meet the objections of its critics.Joe Mintoff is a senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of Newcastle, Australia. His primary research interests are in moral philosophy, specifically the theory of rational choice, moral epistemology, the philosophy of Socrates, and ancient approaches to the question of how to live.

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“…Yet, the targeting system example shows why Aristotle's doctrine is not so implausible after all. For more responses to Hursthouse, see Urmson (1973), Welton and Polansky (1995), Curzer (1996), Pearson (2006), Koehn (2012), and especially Mintoff (2013).…”

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confidence: 99%

Defending the Doctrine of the Mean Against Counterexamples: A General Strategy

Colgrove

2024

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Aristotle's doctrine of the mean states that each moral virtue stands opposed to two types of vice: one of excess and one of deficiency, respectively. Critics claim that some virtues – like honesty, fair‐mindedness, and patience – are counterexamples to Aristotle's doctrine. Here, I develop a generalizable strategy to defend the doctrine of the mean against such counterexamples. I argue that not only is the doctrine of the mean defensible, but taking it seriously also allows us to gain substantial insight into particular virtues. Failure to take the doctrine seriously, moreover, exposes us to the risk of mistaking certain vices for virtues.

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Does the Fearless Phobic really fear the squeak of mice ‘too much’?

Cited by 25 publications

References 0 publications

The Archer and Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean

The Archer and Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean

On the Quantitative Doctrine of the Mean

Defending the Doctrine of the Mean Against Counterexamples: A General Strategy

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