Does the Direct-Response Method Induce Guilt Aversion in a Trust Game?

Abstract

We compare the strategy and direct-response methods in a one-shot trust game with hidden action. In our experiment, the decision elicitation method affects neither participants' behavior nor their beliefs about this behavior. We conclude that the direct-response method does not, by itself, induce guilt aversion.JEL Classification: A13, C91, D03

Reciprocity Effects in the Trust Game

“…Brandts and Charness [9] survey the literature on experiments comparing direct-response and strategy methods and find that, for the most part, decisions are invariant to the method. Amdur and Schmick [10] present similar results specifically for trust games.…”

Guilt Aversion in (New) Games: Does Partners’ Vulnerability Matter?

“…Game Vanberg (2008) Dictator Reuben et al (2009) Trust Ellingsen et al (2010) Dictator Bellemare et al (2011) Trust Chang et al (2011) Trust Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) Participation Dufwenberg et al (2011) Coordination Pelligra (2011) Trust Attanasi et al (2013) Trust Amdur and Schmick (2013) Trust Battigalli et al (2013) Sender-Receiver Beck et al (2013) Credence Good Bracht and Regner (2013) Trust Kawagoe and Narita (2014) Trust Ockenfels and Werner (2014) Dictator Regner and Harth (2014) Trust Andrighetto et al (2015) Trust Khalmetski et al (2015) Dictator Yu et al (2015) Trust Attanasi et al (2016) Trust Hauge (2016) Dictator Ismayilov and Potters (2016) Trust Khalmetski (2016) Sender-Receiver Balafoutas and Sutter (2017) Dictator Balafoutas and Fornwagner (2017) Dictator Bellemare et al (2017) Trust & Dictator Ederer and Stremitzer ( 2017 Dictator Ghidoni and Ploner (2020) Lost Wallet Peeters and Vorsatz (2021) Prisoner Dilemma Participant C receives an initial endowment of 30 ECU. Irrespective of the situation, he does not make any decision.…”

Self-Conscious or Fear of Hurting Another’s Feeling? An Experimental Investigation on Promise-Keeping

“…That is, individuals keep their promises due to self-consciousness 1 . The second is the expectation-based mechanism which is on the basis of the theory of guilt aversion: a promise may change the expectation of the promisee, and the promisor chooses to keep his or her promise and improve the level of cooperation to avoid the feeling of guilt from not fulfilling the other party’s expectation ( Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000 ; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006 ; Amdur and Schmick, 2013 ; Battigalli et al, 2013 ; Ederer and Stremitzer, 2017 , etc.). In other words, an individual keeps his or her promise due to the fear of hurting others’ feelings.…”