Guilt Aversion in (New) Games: Does Partners’ Vulnerability Matter?

Guilt Aversion in (New) Games: Does Partners' Payoff Vulnerability Matter?

“…Indeed, a standard equilibrium analysis has no compelling foundation for games played one-shot, like ours, and in experiments on other-regarding preferences (see section 6.2 ofAttanasi et al, 2016).11 Detailed best-reply analysis and predictions for the behavior of player A can be found in our previous working paper(Attanasi et al, 2022).12 In each game, we assume that B best-responds as if he had truly observed A's move. This holds by standard expected-utility maximization, except for the cases where B is certain that A has chosen Out.…”

Guilt aversion in (new) games: Does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?

“…Detailed best-reply analysis and predictions for the behavior of player A can be found in our previous working paper(Attanasi et al, 2022).15 In each game, we assume that B best-responds as if he had truly observed A's move. This holds by standard expected-utility maximization, except for the cases where B is certain that A has chosen Out.…”