Does "Sorting into Specialization" Explain the Differences in Time Use between Married and Cohabiting Couples? An Empirical Application for Germany

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to identify the sources of time use differences between married and cohabiting couples and to answer the question whether there is a "selection into specialization", i.e. whether cohabiting partners who agree on a (traditional) division of work simply have a higher probability of getting married. In a non-parametric matching approach, we compare couples who get married in the German SocioEconomic Panel between 1991 and 2008 with couples who remain cohabiters. Taking the potential selection into marriage into account, differences in the intra-couple division of market work and child care are considerably reduced by 54 to 66 percent. Thus, couples who anticipate specialization in time use (and its corresponding economic advantages) seem to pre-select into formal marriage. However, remaining differences in time use leave sufficient scope for an additional specializationreinforcing effect of the institutional framework of marriage in Germany, particularly for the subsample of couples who become parents.

Gender and time allocation of cohabiting and married women and men in France, Italy, and the United States

“…Barg and Belbo’s (2010) findings suggest that childcare may be distinct from housework, with selection mechanisms not fully explaining marriage-cohabitation differences in childcare. In married couples, time allocation to childcare becomes more gender differentiated and remains so over time.…”

“…A number of previous studies suggest that there may be gender variation among cohabiting versus married couples (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Barg and Beblo 2010; Cunningham 2005; Davis et al 2007; Domínguez-Folgueras 2012; Gemici and Laufer 2009; Ginther et al 2006; Stratton 2004, Nazio and Saraceno 2013). Stratton (2004) argues that all couples specialize but that specialization makes more sense the longer the time horizon.…”

“…This tends to create greater risk and uncertainty should the relationship disrupt for cohabiting than for married individuals. Legal institutions can directly or indirectly influence marriage behavior – e.g., directly through tax incentives that encourage (or discourage) marriage over cohabitation and indirectly by restricting benefits to married partners versus cohabiting partners (see Barg and Beblo 2010 for a discussion of institutional differences between cohabitation and marriage in Germany; Waaldijk 2003 and 2004 for a comparison of general legal nature of married and cohabiting relations; Bradley 2001 for a “legal tradition” account of differences between marriages and cohabitation in western European Union countries, and the special issue of the “International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family” (Oxford University 2001)). Under conditions where greater benefits and protections accrue to married partners, there may be incentives to marry, especially for the partner with less earning power.…”

“…Barg and Beblo (2010) analyze the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSEOP) where employed married men average four more hours of market work per week than their employed wives compared with a gap half that size for cohabiting couples. Married women are more likely than cohabiting women to not be employed and married women are also less likely than cohabiting women to be employed full time.…”

“…Barg and Belbo (2010) note that there may be family gender role norms that push married women to do more of the nonmarket work than married men and that married men do more of the market work. They argue that cohabiters should be less susceptible to these “family role” norms, which govern marriage far more so than the less institutionalized union type of cohabitation.…”