Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification

Abstract

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. The University of Chicago Press and Southern Political Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Politics.Retrospective voting models assume that offering more information to voters about their incumbents' performance strengthens electoral accountability. However, it is unclear whether incumbent corruption information translates into higher political participation and increased support for challengers. We provide experimental evidence that such information not only decreases incumbent party support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout and support for the challenger party, as well as erodes partisan attachments. While information clearly is necessary to improve accountability, corruption information is not sufficient because voters may respond to it by withdrawing from the political process. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for studies of voting behavior.

Monitoring Corruptible Politicians

“…Besley and Burgess (2002) show that newspaper circulation affects the responsiveness of state governments in India to negative shocks to food production and flooding. 7 Recent evidence based on local and legislative elections in India, Mexico, Uganda, and Brazil is mixed (Banerjee et al 2011;Chong et al 2015;Humphreys and Weinstein 2012;de Figueiredo, Hidalgo, and Kasahara 2014). For a summary of the literature, see Pande (2011) and Olken and Pande (2012).…”

Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying

“…A large literature on information and electoral behavior examines the effects on voters of information related to the desirability of vote buying (Hicken et al, 2014;Vicente, 2014), voting procedures and voting irregularities (Vicente, 2014;Aker et al, 2011); valence issues such as candidate corruption, criminal records, education, attendance at parliamentary sessions (Banerjee et al, 2011;Chong et al, 2015;Humphreys and Weinstein, 2013) and radio broadcasts that increase the demand for public services (Keefer and Khemani, 2014). In their experiment in an Italian mayoral election, Kendall et al (2015) look at the voting effects of information regarding candidate competence and effort relative to information regarding candidate ideology; information about competence increased incumbent vote shares.…”

“…The information intervention by Chong et al (2015) also consists of the distribution of flyers, though they do not investigate vote buying. They distributed three different flyers in 12 Mexican municipalities.…”

Popularity Shocks and Political Selection

“…It allows sufficiently informed voters to assess the government's performance and hold politicians accountable for their actions (Barro, 1973;Mayhew, 1974). An extensive empirical literature shows that voters reduce their support of parties and officials involved in political scandals and reward politicians who are perceived to perform better (Ashworth, 2012;Ferraz and Finan, 2008;Snyder and Hirano, 2012;Chong et al, 2015;Costas-Pérez et al, 2012;Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2016). 1 In this paper, we follow up on these findings and account for the possibility that political parties might anticipate voters' punishment, or reward, and change the composition of the pool of candidates selected to run for office accordingly.…”

“…In addition, Snyder and Hirano (2012) show that in US House elections, incumbents involved in scandals have a higher probability of losing their primary elections, and receive fewer votes in general elections compared to non-scandal incumbents. Chong et al (2015) show that voters punish both incumbents and challengers after receiving information about the inefficient use of public funds in Mexico. Finally, Bobonis et al (2016) find that foreseeable anti-corruption audits reduce corruption in the short-term, as they have a disciplining effect on the incumbent.…”