Does Chance Undermine Would?

Abstract

Counterfactual scepticism holds that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. The main argument for this view appeals to a ‘chance undermines would’ principle: if ψ would have some chance of not obtaining had ϕ obtained, then ϕ □→ ψ is false. This principle seems to follow from two fairly weak principles, namely, that ‘chance ensures could’ and that ϕ □→ ψ and ϕ ⋄→ ¬ ψ clash. Despite their initial plausibility, I show that these principles are independently problematic: given some modest closure principles, they entail absurdities. Moreover, on the most promising strategy for saving these principles, they do not, in the relevant sense, entail the chance-undermines-would principle. Instead, they entail a principle that only supports counterfactual indeterminism, the view that most ordinary counterfactuals are chancy, that is, not settled true. I demonstrate this by developing an indeterminist semantics that vindicates the clash and chance-ensures-could principles but not the chance-undermines-would principle. This view, I argue, offers a better account of our credal and linguistic judgements than counterfactual scepticism.

Counterfactual skepticism is (just) skepticism

“…The contextualist view of knowledge, which we saw in the discussion of partial skepticism, is one way to spell this out; I frame the epistemic view in contextualist terms going forwards. 30,31 29 Moss (2013) and Kocurek (2022) also offer accounts in a similar vein, but with more significant differences of detail.…”

“…29 Moss (2013) and Kocurek (2022) also offer accounts in a similar vein, but with more significant differences of detail. Kocurek endorses the parallel between future claims and counterfactuals, but explains the tension in terms of historical validity: claims like (36) are historical, but not classical, contradictions.…”

“…1 Note that Kocurek (2022) is a recent and admirable exception here. Kocurek shows that Hajek's core principle, Chance Undermines Would, is in tension with standard principles in the logic of counterfactuals.…”