Counterfactual skepticism is (just) skepticism

Abstract

Its devotees are few, but they have a simple, powerful argument in their arsenal: most counterfactuals are chancy; and chancy counterfactuals, they say, cannot be true.The camp of the non-skeptics -much better populated -spends its time on defensive strategies. 1 Stories are given about how counterfactuals could possibly be true, notwithstanding the arguments of the counterfactual skeptic. The defenders presume they only need to hold out: if they can deflect the force of the skeptical argument, counterfactual skepticism will melt away; so heavy are the costs of counterfactual skepticism in their eyes.Should the non-skeptics be so confident? Hajek, the arch counterfactual skeptic, certainly thinks not. He claims counterfactual skepticism has not just a good argument but an attractive world-view. It is the best way, he suggests, of reconciling what we know about counterfactuals with discoveries about fundamental physics. What's more, he claims, this skepticism is benign. The ordinary counterfactuals we assert and reason about can be replaced with more hedged, probabilistic counterfactuals. Perhaps we say false things all the time; but we still hew close enough to the truth.