Does Cadre Turnover Help or Hinder China’s Green Rise? Evidence from Shanxi Province

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in

The effects of three types of China's official turnover on air quality: A regression discontinuity study

“…In order to demonstrate outstanding achievement as soon as possible, the new officials tend to adopt short-sighted policies to stimulate economic growth in a short time. As a result, governments may only concentrate on economic rather than public services (Eaton & Kostka, 2012;Marina, 2015). Some officials are even pursuing economic growth at the cost of excessive resource usage and malignant pollution, thus, providing "grabbing hands" rather than "helping hands" in the provision of public services (Denise, Peter, & Daniel, 2017;Wu et al, 2013).…”

Promotion-driven local states and governing cities in action—re-reading China's urban entrepreneurialism from a local perspective

“…In the context of China's administration decentralization and upward accountability reform (Chien, 2010), what local authorities are most concerned about is their career advancement and the legitimacy of governance, especially those localized issues that are not conducive to the leadership's pursuit of political achievements (Cai, 2004;Eaton & Kostka, 2012). Moreover, the achievements are not always related to improving local competitiveness in global markets (Hubbard and Hall, 1996), while involving broader social, economic and environmental issues (Eaton & Kostka, 2012;Gao, 2015). This is more evident in inland cities/regions that are less attractive to foreign investment and the leadership of which is more conservative and slow-responsive to globalization.…”

“…Nevertheless, the short tenure (often four years) and frequent rotation of local officials combined with their interest in accumulating political achievements have made them quite self-interested and opportunistic (Eaton & Kostka, 2012;Cai, p. 2006). Rather than the implementation itself, they are more concerned with the local effects of materializing upper-level policy priorities/strategic targets and how they can benefit quickly from these actions (see also Chien & Woodworth, 2018).…”

“…The usual strategy adopted by local officials is "selective enforcement" (O'Brien & Li, 1999). In the face of the upper priorities and objectives, officials actively follow those that are considered to bear fruit quickly (Eaton & Kostka, 2012). For those with a longer time to maturityespecially that are unlikely to be realized within their tenure and are incompatible with their political interests, they seek strategies to subtly bypass them.…”

“…For those with a longer time to maturityespecially that are unlikely to be realized within their tenure and are incompatible with their political interests, they seek strategies to subtly bypass them. The discretion of policy innovation and the negotiating space under the target accountability mechanism enable them to interpret upper-level priorities and intentions in a manner consistent with local socio-material realities, and to link upper-level interests with their political concerns and governance preferences (Eaton & Kostka, 2012). As a result, local officials are able to guide local development and infrastructure investments in ways that they believe are the easiest to generate and visualize their governance achievements (Wang, 2013).…”