Do supermajority rules limit or enhance majority tyranny? evidence from the US States, 1960–1997

Abstract

Buchanan and Tullock (1962) demonstrates that supermajority rules can reduce tyranny of majority problems in a democracy. However, recent theoretical work by Dixit, Grossman, and Gul (2000) postulates that this static analysis of supermajority rules may be inadequate to explain political decisions in a dynamic setting. In fact, supermajority rules may increase the incidence of majority tyranny because of rotating political representation. Using data from US state legislatures we examine the effect of supermajority rules on different categories of government expenditures and tax revenues during the latter half of the 20th century. We find supermajority rules have little effect on general government expenditures and tax revenues. However, supermajority rules are associated with lower public welfare transfers, which supports the traditional analysis of the fiscal effects of supermajority rules. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Public Spending and the Paradox of Supermajority Rule

“…In a simple legislative bargaining model, claimed that supermajority requirements to approve tax increases allow government to reduce taxes by delegating taxing power to a pivotal voter who prefers lower taxes. Using data from U.S. state legislatures, and ) found that supermajority rule is indeed associated with lower tax rates and less spending on public welfare, respectively. In a panel of 50 states from 1970 to 2008, showed that supermajority rule lowers redistributive taxes targeted toward narrow groups.…”

“…Choice among voting rules, from a simple majority to unanimity, is said to critically influence budget allocation by altering the distribution of voting powers among different coalitions (; ; ). This article investigates the hypothesis that supermajority rule may increase the size of public spending and taxation.…”

“…A supermajority rule on budget decisions is often claimed to restrain excessive spending and taxation by making the formation of a winning coalition more difficult . Since Buchanan and Tullock wrote The Calculus of Consent (1962), most studies (e.g., ; ) have supported the contention that a supermajority rule reduces redistributive fiscal spending by limiting “majority tyranny.” argued that a qualified majority rule can restrain special interests from seeking private gains by requiring a greater percentage of legislators to support a bill. For instance, a 60% supermajority rule will block spending that can secure the support of only 50% of the legislature.…”

Redistricting Reform Could Save California from Itself

“…The two-thirds requirement to pass the budget empowers the minority party, particularly when trying to raise taxes or, more generally, change the status quo (Knight 2000; but see Bradbury and Johnson 2006;McGann 2004). This can only truly matter if the minority party is sufficiently large and cohesive enough on budget matters.…”

Legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in American States

“…16. See Bohn and Inman (1996), Crain and Miller (1990), Knight (2001), Bradbury and Johnson (2002), and Crain (2003). 17.…”