Do subsidies to cooperative R &amp; D actually stimulate R &amp; D investment and cooperation?

Fölster, Stefan

doi:10.1016/0048-7333(93)00773-m

Cited by 36 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…22 Fölster (1995) studies the effects of different types of R&D subsidies on R&D cooperation and spending for a sample of Swedish industrial firms. Some R&D subsidies require cooperation but allow firms to choose the mode and extent of information sharing (e.g.…”

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confidence: 99%

Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures*

Atallah

2003

Economics of Innovation and New Technology

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CIRANOLe CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisationsmembres, d'une subvention d'infrastructure du ministère de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie, de même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche. Reproduction partielle permise avec citation du document source, incluant la notice ©. Short sections may be quoted without explicit permission, provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the ISSN 1198-8177Ce document est publié dans l'intention de rendre accessibles les résultats préliminaires de la recherche effectuée au CIRANO, afin de susciter des échanges et des suggestions. Les idées et les opinions émises sont sous l'unique responsabilité des auteurs, et ne représentent pas nécessairement les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires. This paper presents preliminary research carried out at CIRANO and aims at encouraging discussion and comment. The observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of CIRANO or its partners. Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation inResearch Joint Ventures * Gamal Atallah † Résumé / AbstractLe partage d'information et la stabilité de la coopération dans les consortiums de recherche. Cet article examine le partage de technologie et la stabilité de la coopération dans les consortiums de recherche (RJVs) dont le but est la réduction des coûts de production. Dans un jeu à trois étapes, les firmes prennent des décisions quant à leur participation à la RJV, au partage d'information et aux dépenses en R&D, et à leur output. Une caractéristique importante du modèle est que le partage volontaire d'information au sein de la RJV augmente les fuites d'information vers les non-membres. On montre que les RJVs représentant une plus grande proportion des firmes dans l'industrie ont davantage tendance à partager l'information. Lorsqu'il n'en coûte rien de partager l'information, les firmes ne choisissent pas des niveaux intermédiaires de partage d'information: l'information est partagée au complet ou pas du tout. La taille de la RJV dépend de trois effets: un effet de coordination, un effet d'information et un effet de concurrence. Dépendamment de l'importance relative de ces trois effets, la taille de la RJV peut augmenter ou diminuer avec les externalités. Lorsque les fuites d'information vers les non-membres augmentent, les membres de la RJV réduisent leurs dépenses en R&D. De plus, soit qu'ils augmentent la taille de la RJV en maintenant le partage d'information (lorsque les externalités sont faibles), soit qu'ils réduisent la taille de la RJV et le partage d'information (lorsque les externalités sont élevées). L'effet du partage d'information sur la profitabilité des firmes ainsi que sur le bien-être est exami...

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Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures*

Atallah

2003

Economics of Innovation and New Technology

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“…Although companies ultimately apply the results of R&D, conducting R&D typically is not left to companies alone. Katz (1986) and Fölster (1995) explained that private firm incentives to conduct R&D may be smaller than the socially optimal incentives. Therefore, public subsidies for cooperative R&D may be an effective tool.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Cooperative research and technology dynamics: the role of research strategy development in NSF Science and Technology Centres

Steenhuis¹,

Gray²

2006

IJTTC

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In the highly competitive global economy, virtually all technology-based firms rely on R&D inputs from outside organisations. In the USA context universities, particularly cooperative centres, are the primary source of R&D for most firms. National Science Foundation (NSF) funded Science and Technology Centres perform a pivotal role in technology development and management for the USA. Despite their importance, the management of various types of centres and in particular their research strategy development approach is not well understood. This paper in an extension of a study on research strategy formation processes within Science and Technology Centres, building on previous exploratory case studies. It was found that Science and Technology Centres use strategy formation approaches that are fundamentally different than those used in other types of centres. Also, the developed strategies vary in their characteristics. This paper sheds light on strategic processes in a new type of boundary-spanning organisation and suggestions are provided for future research.

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“…70 The implied risk for evaluation programs that adopt commercial indices of success is that they would create just such an incentive to fund R&D activity that would have been funded in any event. 71 Fölster 72 analyzes a sample of 540 R&D projects of Swedish firms and their research competitors. His results indicate that R&D subsidy programs that allow firms to choose the form of cooperation do not increase the probability of cooperation, but increase the incentive to invest in R&D. Subsidies that require firms to cooperate and to share results increase the probability that firms will cooperate, but decrease the incentive to invest in R&D. 73 Rosenfeld 74 reports two case studies of evaluations of US state programs to promote network cooperation among small-and medium-sized enterprises.…”

Section: Government Support For Private Randdmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evaluation of Strategic Research Partnerships

Martin¹

2003

Technology Analysis & Strategic Management

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Do subsidies to cooperative R & D actually stimulate R & D investment and cooperation?

Cited by 36 publications

References 16 publications

Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures*

Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures*

Cooperative research and technology dynamics: the role of research strategy development in NSF Science and Technology Centres

The Evaluation of Strategic Research Partnerships

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