Do Subjects Understand Base Rates?

Kleiter, Gernot D.; Krebs, Marianne; Doherty, Michael E.; Garavan, Hugh; Chadwick, Randall; Brake, Gregory L.

doi:10.1006/obhd.1997.2727

Cited by 25 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Dependent on the frequency with which we experienced that an event e has followed the type of situation we face again, predictions are made with more or less certainty. In order to come up with a stable representation about event frequencies we must face the same type of situations over and over again, i.e., within a so-called natural sampling (Gigerenzer, 1994;Hasher and Zacks, 1979;Kleiter et al, 1997). The acquired representation of probabilities of an event's occurrence are applied to external stimulus properties, so that a distinction between differently probable events is possible.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Predicting events of varying probability: uncertainty investigated by fMRI

Volz¹,

Schubotz²,

Cramon³

2003

NeuroImage

193

161

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Many everyday life predictions rely on the experience and memory of event frequencies, i.e., natural samplings. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the neural substrates of prediction under varying uncertainty based on a natural sampling approach. The study focused particularly on a comparison with other types of externally attributed uncertainty, such as guessing, and on the frontomedian cortex, which is known to be engaged in many types of decisions under uncertainty. On the basis of preceding stimulus cues, participants predicted events that occurred with probabilities ranging from p ϭ 0.6 to p ϭ 1.0. In contrast to certain predictions in a control task, predictions under uncertainty elicited activations within a posterior frontomedian area (mesial BA 8) and within a set of subcortical areas which are known to subserve dopaminergic modulations. The parametric analysis revealed that activation within the mesial BA 8 significantly increased with increasing uncertainty. A comparison with other types of uncertainty indicates that frontomedian correlates of frequency-based prediction appear to be comparable with those induced in long-term stimulus-response adaptation processes such as hypothesis testing, in contrast to those engaged in short-term error processing such as guessing.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Predicting events of varying probability: uncertainty investigated by fMRI

Volz¹,

Schubotz²,

Cramon³

2003

NeuroImage

193

161

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“…The answer is clearly no in the domain of reasoning under uncertainty. A conjunction fallacy remains a conjunction fallacy, neglecting base rates remains a neglect (Kleiter et al, 1997), etc. Though, it is not the same when probabilistic models are applied to "purely" logical tasks.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a mental probability logic

Pfeifer

Kleiter

2005

PSYCHOL BELG

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We propose probability logic as an appropriate standard of reference for evaluating human inferences. Probability logical accounts of nonmonotonic reasoning with SYSTEM P, and conditional syllogisms (MODUS PONENS, etc.) are explored. Furthermore, we present categorical syllogisms with intermediate quantifiers, like the "MOST …" quantifier. While most of the paper is theoretical and intended to stimulate psychological studies, we also summarize our empirical studies on human nonmonotonic reasoning.

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Section: Findings On Base-rate Neglectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, monetary incentives can decrease the extent of base-rate neglect (Brase, Fiddick, & Harries, 2006), as well as providing information in natural frequency format (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; but see Kleiter et al, 1997). However, the reasons for the latter is likely not a natural capability for frequency processing, as originally proposed, but the mere fact that frequencies sometimes make it easier to construct adequate mental representations (Fiedler, Brinkmann, Betsch, & Wild, 2000;Kleiter et al, 1997). Furthermore, some evidence exists that individuals might be trained sufficiently to take base-rates into account more properly (Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 2001).…”

Section: Findings On Base-rate Neglectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Base-rate neglect seems to be independent of response format. Although base-rate neglect has been classically investigated using judgments of posterior probabilities as dependent variables (e.g., BarHillel, 1980;De Neys & Glumicic, 2008;Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), it has also been observed for choices (e.g., Goodie & Fantino, 1999;Kleiter et al, 1997).Several factors influence the prevalence and the size of base-rate neglect (Koehler, 1996). For example, monetary incentives can decrease the extent of base-rate neglect (Brase, Fiddick, & Harries, 2006), as well as providing information in natural frequency format (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; but see Kleiter et al, 1997).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Base-rate respect by intuition: Approximating rational choices in base-rate tasks with multiple cues

Glöckner¹,

Dickert²

2008

PsycEXTRA Dataset

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Although intuitive-automatic processes sometimes lead to systematic biases in judgment and choice, in many situations especially this kind of processes enables people to approximate rational choices. In complex base-rate tasks with repeated outcome feedback we observed choices which were in line with the Bayes' solution in 86% of the cases and which were made within a relatively short time (i.e., 2.2 seconds). The results indicate reliance on extremely wellcalibrated intuition. This view is supported by the findings that choice proportions are almost perfectly predicted by posterior probabilities (r = .93), and that error rates, response times and confidence ratings are highly correlated with inconsistency in the provided information. Our results support the hypothesis that parallel constraint satisfaction models may account for the processes underlying intuition and make the application of simple heuristics and deliberate strategies very unlikely. Taking an interdisciplinary perspective, implications for economic and psychological modeling are outlined. Base-rate Neglect and IntuitionTo be successful in a fundamentally uncertain world, individuals have to make a multitude of judgments and decisions based on probabilistic information. Research on judgment and decision making has repeatedly shown systematic biases in probability assessment and in applying the rules of probability (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002;Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982;Reyna, 2004;Slovic, 1987). One of the most prominent and well established findings is individuals' neglect of base-rate probabilities. 1 This has been, for instance, demonstrated in the following task (e.g., Bar-Hillel, 1980): Two cab companies, Blue and Green, operate in a given city. Eighty-five percent of the cabs in the city are Blue, and the remaining 15% are Green. A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. A witness later identified the cab as a Green cab. The court tested the witness' ability to distinguish between Blue and Green cabs under nighttime visibility conditions. The witness was able to identify each color correctly about 80% of the time, but confused it with the other color about 20% of the time. What is the probability that the accident was caused by the Green company?To answer this question, both the base rate of green cabs (15%) and the validity of the eyewitness (80%) have to be taken into account. However, most people consider only the latter and give the answer that signals neglect of the base rate, namely 80%. There have been several attempts to explain base-rate neglect and to provide solutions to solve the problem (for an overview see Barbey & Sloman, 2007). In line with earlier approaches (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), Barbey and Sloman proposed that base-rate neglect is due to associative / intuitive (i.e., system 1) judgment strategies that fail to adequately represent the structure of the problem. Our research empirically tests and expands this intriguing theory. In line with Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson (...

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Do Subjects Understand Base Rates?

Cited by 25 publications

References 37 publications

Predicting events of varying probability: uncertainty investigated by fMRI

Predicting events of varying probability: uncertainty investigated by fMRI

Towards a mental probability logic

Base-rate respect by intuition: Approximating rational choices in base-rate tasks with multiple cues

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