Do Polls Create Momentum in Political Competition?

Denter, Philipp; Sisak, Dana

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2340125

Cited by 16 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 49 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Denter and Sisak (2015) show that poll results affect campaigning spending which in turn affect how voters vote. Bernhardt et al (2009), Morgan and Stocken (2008) and Meirowitz (2005) show that polls are used to clear uncertainty over voters preferences, but at the same time this can give rise to strategic poll answering on behalf of the voters.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Polling in a proportional representation system

Mavridis

Ortuño‐Ortín

2018

Soc Choice Welf

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study the effects of opinion polls on election results in proportional representation systems. Moderate voters have preferences over the vote shares received by the parties so that an agent's optimal voting decision might depend on the other agents' behavior. A voter's information about other voters' behavior can be improved through a series of opinion polls. We show that the mass of undecided voters decreases monotonically with the number of polls, but may not necessarily disappear. Voters who remain undecided have centrist ideologies. On average a series of polls brings the society closer to complete information even though specific polls may push the election result away from the complete information case.

show abstract

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Polling in a proportional representation system

Mavridis

Ortuño‐Ortín

2018

Soc Choice Welf

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Denter and Sisak (2013) show that e¤ort may increase with revelation if marginal e¤orts are concave. They use their set-up to analyze the e¤ect of polls on political campaign spending, allowing for an initial asymmetry before the beginning of the …rst period.…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments

Klein

Schmutzler

2014

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: This paper analyzes two-stage rank-order tournaments. A principal decides (i) how to spread prize money across the two periods, (ii) how to weigh performance in the two periods when awarding the second-period prize, and (iii) whether to reveal performance after the …rst period. The information revelation policy depends exclusively on properties of the e¤ort cost function. The principal always puts a positive weight on …rst-period performance in the second period. The size of the weight and the optimal prizes depend on properties of the observation error distribution; they should be chosen so as to strike a balance between the competitiveness of …rst-and second-period tournaments. In particular, the principal sets no …rst-period prize unless the observations in period one are considerably more precise than in period two. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may JEL: D02, D44

show abstract

“…Alternatively, consider an electoral competition. Candidates' relative standing can largely be inferred from their status in public opinion polls, which, in turn, affects the momentum in the dynamics (Denter and Sisak 2015).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

On Equilibrium Player Ordering in Dynamic Team Contests

2020

Economic Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study equilibrium player ordering in a dynamic all‐pay contest between two teams. The contest lasts two periods, and each team consists of two players who perform in different periods on behalf of their teams. The team with the higher aggregate output wins the prize, which is a public good to its players. Each team has one stronger player and one weaker player, and the two teams can differ in their values of the prize. The teams maximize their winning odds by strategically assigning their players to different periods. We find that when the intrateam heterogeneity in player ability is not excessive, the teams would allocate their stronger players to the late positions as the “anchormen.” When both the intrateam ability gap and interteam heterogeneity in teams' values become excessively large, the team with high value always places its stronger player in the early position, who will place a large bid to preempt late competition. (JEL C7, D7, D8)

show abstract

Do Polls Create Momentum in Political Competition?

Cited by 16 publications

References 49 publications

Polling in a proportional representation system

Polling in a proportional representation system

Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments

On Equilibrium Player Ordering in Dynamic Team Contests

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About