Do Overconfident Workers Cooperate Less? The Relationship Between Overconfidence and Cooperation in Team Production

Mertins, Vanessa; Hoffeld, Wolfgang

doi:10.1002/mde.2667

Cited by 12 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…Overconfidence can be viewed as an overestimation of one's own abilities and outcomes relating to one's own personal situation (Brown & Sarma, ; Mertins & Hoffeld, ). The impact of overconfidence on economic decisions is a controversial issue.…”

Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Better innovators or more innovators? Managerial overconfidence and corporate R&D

2018

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We use 3 measures of managerial overconfidence: the press coverage of chief executive officers, his/her age, and his/her experience in the industry. Our results show that the firms run by overconfident managers actually invest more in R&D expenditures, even after controlling for country, industry, and time factors. Overconfident managers not only spend more on R&D but also amplify the effect of financial determinants of R&D such as firm liquidity or profitability. Nevertheless, overconfident managers do not invest efficiently in R&D, and these expenditures can negatively affect the value of the firm.

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Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Better innovators or more innovators? Managerial overconfidence and corporate R&D

2018

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“…Graves and Ringuest () examined the behavioral consequences of overconfidence and disappointment in the funding decisions of venture capitalists through deterministic and stochastic models based on empirical data. Mertins and Hoffeld () examined the relationship between individual overconfidence and voluntary cooperation in workplace behavior and explored the driving factors behind this.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managerial overconfidence, overinvestment, and R&D spillover

Zhou

2019

Manage Decis Econ

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This paper examines whether a firm will select an overoptimistic manager when a cost-reduction investment has a spillover effect. We consider a Cournot competition model where R&D investment ex ante occurs before the process of product market competition. Our analysis reveals that there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium for firms to delegate overoptimistic managers. We show that only when the spillover effect is sufficiently high do firms benefit from delegation. Furthermore, the equilibrium confidence level and investment decision first decrease and then increase as the spillover parameter changes. As the initial production cost increases, the equilibrium performance becomes worse.1 we assume herein that the product is perfectly substitutable and that innovation spillover is symmetric. In further studies, we will extend the model to an asymmetric scenario and examine whether our results still hold.

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“…We find that the effects of ego-relevance and the nature of the task are strongly intertwined with conditional cooperation, measured as the beliefs about the teammate's contribution to the task. The role of beliefs as essential predictors of contribution decisions in social dilemmas is not new (Fischbacher et al, 2001;Mertins and Hoffeld, 2015). However, we show how ego-relevance magnifies the effect of beliefs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 64%

Ego-relevance in team production

Mantilla¹,

Murad²

2020

Preprint

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We study how individuals' contribution to a team production task varies depending on whether the task is ego relevant or not. We design and conduct an experiment to test the effect of ego-relevance in two types of team tasks: when contributions are complementary and substitutable. Ego-relevance is manipulated by calling the Raven IQ Test an “IQ Task” or a “Pattern Task”. We find that the effects of ego-relevance are mediated by beliefs about the teammate's contributions. Subjects act as conditional cooperators. However, the pessimistic ones contribute even less in the Ego-relevant condition, whereas the optimistic ones contribute more in the Ego-relevant condition. We do not find the nature of team production process being complementary or substitutable moderating the effect of ego-relevance on contribution decisions.

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Do Overconfident Workers Cooperate Less? The Relationship Between Overconfidence and Cooperation in Team Production

Cited by 12 publications

References 43 publications

Better innovators or more innovators? Managerial overconfidence and corporate R&D

Better innovators or more innovators? Managerial overconfidence and corporate R&D

Managerial overconfidence, overinvestment, and R&D spillover

Ego-relevance in team production

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