Divine Simplicity in Historical Perspective: Resourcing a Contemporary Discussion

Abstract

This article seeks to resource contemporary discussions about divine simplicity by exploring how this doctrine was understood throughout patristic and medieval church history, especially with respect to the relation of divine simplicity to the doctrine of the Trinity. It argues, first, that there have been different versions of divine simplicity throughout church history, though most current treatments focus on the Thomist version. Second, it suggests that divine simplicity had a greater role in the witness and worship of the church than is generally recognized today. Third, it argues that many of the differences between contemporary and ancient treatments of divine simplicity boil down to more basic ontological differences. Finally, it draws attention to the close connection between divine simplicity and the Trinity throughout church history, and suggests that the doctrine of divine simplicity provides a more reliable means of grounding the Trinity as monotheistic than the doctrine of perichoresis.Since the publication of Alvin Plantinga's Does God Have a Nature? 1 in 1980, the doctrine of divine simplicity has received a significant increase of attention from a number of philosophers and theologians. Much of the recent treatment of divine simplicity has been critical. A wide variety of arguments have been raised against divine simplicity, including: (1) abstract properties cannot be identified with a concrete, personal God; 2 (2) if God is identical to his properties, his properties are all * Historical Theology, Fuller Theological Seminary,

Shoring up divine simplicity against modal collapse: a powers account

“…a position that is clearly odious to Christian theology’ at Torrance (2013), 200–201; while Thomas McCall calls Mullins's argument an ‘extremely important charge’ and a ‘very serious objection’ at McCall (2014), 53–54. Since the 2013 publication of Mullins's article, his claim that divine simplicity leads to modal collapse has been cited also as evidence against divine simplicity at Smith (2014), 71 n. 55; Ortlund (2014), 436–453; McNall (2015), 65 n. 57; and Hinlicky (2016), 23.…”

“…One might, for instance, develop an account of divine simplicity that rejects the claim that God is identical to God's attributes, as did Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa; see Radde-Gallwitz (2009), especially pages 143–169 and 175–218. Gavin Ortlund has traced the development of this understanding of divine simplicity in St John of Damascus at Ortlund (2014), 440–441. Recently, Mark Spencer has employed this strain of Cappadocian thought, mediated through the Palamite essence/energy distinction, to modify the Thomist account of divine simplicity in response to the challenge of reconciling divine simplicity and divine freedom; see Spencer (2017), particularly pages 136–139.…”