Divide and rule: ten lessons about Russian political influence activities in Europe

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to improve understanding of how Russia is conducting political influence activities against Europe. It examines current thinking and perceptions on this topic among Western secret services and is based on an analysis of approximately 40 annual reports from 15 secret services in 11 Western countries, covering the period 2014-2018. This activity is by nature covert, and the analysis given in these reports from Western secret services complements other research and shows the broad range of tools and techniques employed for political influence, and much detail on the execution of these activities. According to these secret services, Russia is the foreign state that tries to influence European politics and decision-making most, and more so than China and other states. These influence activities support three main Russian strategic objectives: regime security, predominance in Russia's near abroad, and world-power status for Russia. The longterm objective of Russian influence activities is to weaken NATO and the EU. In the shorter term, it is to lift the sanctions imposed after the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014. Russia also has more specific objectives related to each individual country. Russia is targeting the West through a divide and rule approach, using multiple tools of influence. The population is mainly reached through media and social media, exploiting divisive issues. Minorities, refugees, and extremists are used to further this divide and rule approach. Human intelligence and cyber operations are important covert tools of influence. Russia also uses the energy sector, business, and corruption as venues for influence. It has an extensive network of allies and front organizations, and reconstructs reality and rewrites history to legitimize itself and undermine others. Finally, military force is Russia's ultimate tool of influence. These influence activities are of large-scale, and the threat should be taken seriously, but the reports studied also indicate that the effects of these activities are limited.

Hvordan kan vi beskytte valg mot fremmed påvirkning?

“…En trusselvurdering fra amerikansk etterretning til Senatet fremhevet Russland, Kina og Iran som aktører i forbindelse med valgpåvirkning (DNI, 2019). Av statlige aktører har vestlige sikkerhetstjenester identifisert Russland som den mest aktive aktøren for politisk påvirkning generelt ( Karlsen, 2019). Kina driver også betydelig politisk påvirkning, og det er en rekke andre mindre aktører, hvor saerlig Iran fremheves.…”

Kremlin Information Campaign in the Baltic States During the Covid-19 Pandemic Escalation of Spring 2020

“…G.H. Karlsen (2019) analyses intelligence reports from various countries and argues that Russia has three primary strategic goals: ensuring the power and security of the Putin administration in the country; maintaining influence in the "near abroad" (former USSR countries except three Baltic states); and securing the status of a great power internationally. Russia's influence operations outside the post-Soviet space disseminate strategic narratives that amplify or shape perceptions of the world and political preferences in line with the Kremlin's foreign policy goals (Mölder, Sazonov, 2018;van Herpen, 2016).…”

“…The Kremlin's official strategic narratives no longer speak about the Baltic states as an integral part of the Russian empire, but they are certainly interested in their connection with Russia's sphere of influence in that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would possibly become a "window to Europe" allowing Moscow to put constant pressure on Western political institutions such as the European Union and NATO (Radin, 2017;Karlsen, 2019). For this reason, the Putin regime is interested in fostering an unstable region with strong Eurosceptic sentiments.…”

The risks of NATO’s maladaptation

“…This being said, the range of threats emanating from Russia cannot be equated to their sole military dimension. As a matter of fact, threats coming from Russia embrace the broad spectrum of contemporary threats, from hard core military to political warfare, information operations, cyber attacks, under-the-radar covert and/or criminal action (see Rumer 2016, Hagen Karlsen 2019. Many of these threats can furthermore materialise from within the territory of the Alliance.…”