Diversion in the Criminal Justice System

Abstract

This paper provides the first causal estimates on the popular, cost-saving practice of diversion in the criminal justice system, an intervention that provides offenders with a second chance to avoid a criminal record. We exploit two natural experiments in Harris County, Texas where first-time felony defendants faced abrupt changes in the probability of diversion. Using administrative data and regression discontinuity methods, we find robust evidence across both experiments that diversion cuts reoffending rates in half and grows quarterly employment rates by nearly 50 percent over 10 years. The change in trajectory persists even 20 years out and is concentrated among young black men. An investigation of mechanisms strongly suggests that stigma associated with a felony conviction plays a key role in generating these results. Other possible mechanisms including changes in incarceration, other universal adjustments in policy or practice, and differences in criminal processing are ruled out empirically.

Do Private Prisons Affect Criminal Sentencing?

“…The first-more deleterious-explanation is that private prison companies may directly influence judges, for example through campaign contributions or even outright bribes as in the "kids for cash" scandal. A second possibility is that judges internalize the cost-savings associated with private prisons, consistent with other evidence that judges trade off benefits of longer sentences (primarily lowered recidivism) against their fiscal burden (Ouss, 2018;Mueller-Smith and Schnepel, 2019). 5 The cost-savings motive resonates particularly with the core effect being concentrated in the two months after a prison's opening because most states guarantee private prisons to pay for an occupancy of between three-quarters to ninety percent of their bed capacity (In the Public Interest, 2013), effectively reducing the marginal fiscal burden of an inmate to zero up to this guaranteed occupancy.…”

“…There is a closely related literature on the consequences of judicial decision making for defendant outcomes (Kling, 2006;Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2013;Galasso and Schankerman, 2014;Aizer and Doyle Jr, 2015;Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang, 2018;Mueller-Smith and Schnepel, 2019;Norris, Pecenco, and Weaver, 2019;Bhuller, Dahl, Løken, and Mogstad, 2020). 7 In this literature, we relate closely to Mukherjee (2019).…”

Locking up my generation: Cohort differences in prison spells over the life course

“…Criminal justice involvement earlier in life can have persistent impacts on one's penal career (Crow, 2008; Kutateladze, Andiloro, Johnson, & Spohn, 2014; Mueller‐Smith & Schnepel, 2019; Pager, 2003; Wooldredge, Frank, Goulette, & Travis, 2015). First, earlier convictions often become permanent records and accumulate into criminal history.…”

“…Police, prosecutors, or judges can react more punitively to offenders with prior convictions at each stage of a criminal proceeding (Crow, 2008; Kutateladze et al., 2014; Wooldredge et al., 2015). At the system level, “penal code escalations or risk classification algorithms” in the sentencing process often depend on criminal conviction history (Mueller‐Smith & Schnepel, 2019, p. 19). Second, earlier criminal justice sanctions can generate negative consequences for life chances such as labor market participation, which can then hinder desistance from crime at a later age (Dobbie, Goldin, & Yang, 2018; Laub & Sampson, 2003; Mueller‐Smith & Schnepel, 2019; Pager, 2003; Western & Beckett, 1999).…”

Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

“…This is consistent with the “reintegrative shaming” theory of Braithwaite () and the results of Coricelli, Rusconi, and Villeval () showing in a tax evasion context that pardon reduces future violations whereas in the absence of pardon, offenders have no more moral motivation to comply once reputation is lost. Our results are also consistent with those of Mueller‐Smith and Schnepel () who show that court deferrals (which avoid formal convictions through probation) for first‐time felony defendants reduce recidivism, whereas no effect is found for repeat offenders.…”