2022
DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2021.100834
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Diversification and financialization of non-financial corporations: Evidence from China

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Cited by 53 publications
(27 citation statements)
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“…Based on this, controls for corporate governance characteristics are added, including board size (Board), management shareholding (Mhold), and senior executives' academic background (MColl). Third, Feng et al (2022) found that there are great differences in the financial investment levels of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises, as well as enterprises with different technological attributes. Therefore, enterprise characteristics are controlled, including the company's establishment period (Age), enterprise nature (SOE), technological attributes (Tech), and type of audit opinion (Opin).…”
Section: Control Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Based on this, controls for corporate governance characteristics are added, including board size (Board), management shareholding (Mhold), and senior executives' academic background (MColl). Third, Feng et al (2022) found that there are great differences in the financial investment levels of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises, as well as enterprises with different technological attributes. Therefore, enterprise characteristics are controlled, including the company's establishment period (Age), enterprise nature (SOE), technological attributes (Tech), and type of audit opinion (Opin).…”
Section: Control Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… (1) Analyst coverage and audit firms The opportunity to commit misconduct is higher in firms with weak external monitoring. Analysts and auditors are generally regarded as two mechanisms of external monitoring (e.g., Cheng et al, 2020; Feng et al, 2022; Su & Liu, 2021; Yao et al, 2020). We first test whether the inhibitory effect varies in firms with different levels of analyst coverage.…”
Section: Mechanism and Further Analysesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, this demonstrates that the excessive engagement of non-financial capital enterprises in financial business development has certain negative effects on individuals, enterprises, and society, although the development of corporate financialization promotes the rapid development of enterprises to a certain extent; moreover, to curb corporate financialization, it is necessary to explore the reasons behind the influence of corporate financialization. The literature on the causes of corporate financialization mainly covers shareholder value creation pressures (Modell & Yang, 2018), technological and ideological changes (Davis & Kim, 2015), trust structures (Harrington, 2017), employee stock ownership plans (Feng et al, 2022a), business diversification (Feng et al, 2022b), multiple blockholders (Jiang et al, 2022), and increases in the cash holdings of non-financial firms, and it provides support for the possibilities that traditional non-financial firms are increasingly engaging in for-profit lending (Davis, 2018). While most of these influences have been studied only in terms of corporate behavior and social relations, few studies have explored how institutional reforms and related policy implementations can influence corporate financialization.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%