Distributive Justice: From Steinhaus, Knaster, and Banach to Elster and Rawls — The Perspective of Sociological Game Theory

Abstract

Abstract. This article presents a relatively straightforward theoretical framework about distributive justice with applications. It draws on a few key concepts of Sociological Game Theory (SGT). SGT is presented briefly in section 2. Section 3 provides a spectrum of distributive cases concerning principles of equality, differentiation among recipients according to performance or contribution, status or authority, or need. Two general types of social organization of distributive judgment are distinguished and judgment procedures or algorithms are modeled in each type of social organization. Section 4 discusses briefly the larger moral landscapes of human judgment -how distribution may typically be combined with other value into consideration. The article suggests that Rawls, Elster, and Machado point in this direction. Finally, it is suggested that the SGT framework presented provides a useful point of departure to systematically link it and compare the Warsaw School of Fair Division, Rawls, and Elster, among others.

Sociological Game Theory: Agency, Social Structures and Interaction Processes

“…In the following discussion, we single out a few key factors in sociological game theorizing. They point to the broad extension of game theory that IGT and SGT accomplish -and why they constitute, arguably, a substantial alternative to classical game theory [Burns, 1990;Burns, Roszkowska, 2005;Burns et al, 2014;Goffman, 1969;Manning, 1992].…”

“…A "party", for example can be an individual or a group as a player, pawn, token… [Goffman, 1969]. Roles and role relationships in SGT are the bases of a series of conceptualizations and analyses ( Burns, Roszkowska, 2014, 2007. Particular roles entail characteristic value orientations, belief or model complexes, action repertoires, and judgment complexes.…”

“…On the other hand, although sociologically informed, Goffman's approach to strategic interaction fails to systematically distinguish a number of social relational and institutional forms -which were also totally neglected by classical game theory -such as relations of close friendship and intimacy, solidarity, enmity, hierarchy, market, and state-citizen relations; in addition, diverse cases of negotiation and conflict resolution have been a particular focus of SGT. While IGT considered moral and normative aspects of interaction only superficially, these subjects have been given substantial attention in SGT -and have resulted in concepts of normative equilibria, moral dilemmas, normative-instrumental dilemmas, and distributive justice issues [Burns, Roszkowska, 2005, 2008, 2009Burns et al, 2014].…”