Distributional effects of property rights: Transitions in the Atlantic Herring fishery

Brandt, Sylvia; McEvoy, David M.

doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2005.09.007

Cited by 15 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…In fisheries, this allows influential fishers to limit competition via governance systems (26,74). It is a direct contravention of the theoretical logic of ITQs and ensures that any potential benefits in the form of increased efficiency through competition may be lost due to a combination of monopsony power in the market for quota and capture of political rents from the ITQ system (75)(76)(77)(78)(79)(80)(81). Furthermore, by "locking-in" overly simple ITQs via regulatory capture, power disconnects reduce flexibility in the long-run, thereby increasing systemic vulnerability (44,82,83).…”

Section: Power Disconnectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moving beyond panaceas in fisheries governance

Young

Webster

Cox

et al. 2018

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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In fisheries management-as in environmental governance more generally-regulatory arrangements that are thought to be helpful in some contexts frequently become panaceas or, in other words, simple formulaic policy prescriptions believed to solve a given problem in a wide range of contexts, regardless of their actual consequences. When this happens, management is likely to fail, and negative side effects are common. We focus on the case of individual transferable quotas to explore the panacea mindset, a set of factors that promote the spread and persistence of panaceas. These include conceptual narratives that make easy answers like panaceas seem plausible, power disconnects that create vested interests in panaceas, and heuristics and biases that prevent people from accurately assessing panaceas. Analysts have suggested many approaches to avoiding panaceas, but most fail to conquer the underlying panacea mindset. Here, we suggest the codevelopment of an institutional diagnostics toolkit to distill the vast amount of information on fisheries governance into an easily accessible, open, on-line database of checklists, case studies, and related resources. Toolkits like this could be used in many governance settings to challenge users' understandings of a policy's impacts and help them develop solutions better tailored to their particular context. They would not replace the more comprehensive approaches found in the literature but would rather be an intermediate step away from the problem of panaceas.

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Section: Power Disconnectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moving beyond panaceas in fisheries governance

Young

Webster

Cox

et al. 2018

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…In many fisheries, the number of vessels and fishing capacity have decreased after the implementation of an ITQ program (see e.g. Townsend (2005), Sanchirico and Newell (2003), Wang (1995), Brandt and McEvoy (2006), Agar et al (2014), Dupont et al (2005), Hamon et al (2009)).…”

Section: Literature On Evaluation Of Rights-based Management Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Examination of the Peruvian Anchovy Individual Vessel Quota (IVQ) system

et al. 2019

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose, as provided below. No derivative work is allowed.Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.

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“…(2005), Dupont, Fox et al (2005), Brandt and McEvoy (2006), Hamon, Thébaud et al (2009), Agar, Stephen et al (2014.…”

Section: Literature Review On Itq Fisheriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluation of the Chilean Jack Mackerel ITQ System

Kroetz¹,

Sanchirico²,

Peña-Torres³

et al. 2016

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work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose, as provided below. No derivative work is allowed.Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.Following a peer review process, and with previous written consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a revised version of this work may also be reproduced in any academic journal, including those indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Therefore, the restriction to receive income from such publication shall only extend to the publication's author(s). With regard to such restriction, in case of any inconsistency between the Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license and these statements, the latter shall prevail.Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license. Tables Table 1: Timeline The debate in commercial fishery management has evolved from whether well-defined rights are necessary for sustainability to measuring the impacts of different rights-based system designs. Most assessments are on developed world fisheries. Using a unique collection of datasets, we develop counterfactuals to evaluate the impacts of the Chilean Jack Mackerel catch share program. We investigate vessel and trip characteristics, as well as trip costs and revenues, before and after the implementation of the program. We find an increase in higher value products and associated revenue, as well as consolidation of catch on larger vessels, vessels taking longer trips, and catching more per trip. Overall, we estimate that the program led to a measureable increase in fishing profits, mainly due to movement toward higher value products. A back-of-the-envelope calculation results in an implied annual quota rental rate on the order of ~15-19% of ex-vessel prices. JEL Codes. Q22

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Distributional effects of property rights: Transitions in the Atlantic Herring fishery

Cited by 15 publications

References 15 publications

Moving beyond panaceas in fisheries governance

Moving beyond panaceas in fisheries governance

Examination of the Peruvian Anchovy Individual Vessel Quota (IVQ) system

Evaluation of the Chilean Jack Mackerel ITQ System

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