Evaluation of the Chilean Jack Mackerel ITQ System

Abstract

work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose, as provided below. No derivative work is allowed.Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.Following a peer review process, and with previous written consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a revised version of this work may also be reproduced in any academic journal, including those indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Therefore, the restriction to receive income from such publication shall only extend to the publication's author(s). With regard to such restriction, in case of any inconsistency between the Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license and these statements, the latter shall prevail.Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license. Tables Table 1: Timeline The debate in commercial fishery management has evolved from whether well-defined rights are necessary for sustainability to measuring the impacts of different rights-based system designs. Most assessments are on developed world fisheries. Using a unique collection of datasets, we develop counterfactuals to evaluate the impacts of the Chilean Jack Mackerel catch share program. We investigate vessel and trip characteristics, as well as trip costs and revenues, before and after the implementation of the program. We find an increase in higher value products and associated revenue, as well as consolidation of catch on larger vessels, vessels taking longer trips, and catching more per trip. Overall, we estimate that the program led to a measureable increase in fishing profits, mainly due to movement toward higher value products. A back-of-the-envelope calculation results in an implied annual quota rental rate on the order of ~15-19% of ex-vessel prices. JEL Codes. Q22

The Impact of Property Rights to Fish on Remote Communities in Alaska

“…Homans and Wilen (2005) suggest efficiency gains after the adoption of IFQs occur due to (i) additional access to high-value markets and (ii) reductions in fixed costs, often through consolidation. Two recent studies of institutionally different property right changes, in the Peruvian Anchovy and Chilean Jack Mackerel fisheries, suggest both saw increases in high-value product and consolidation of the harvesting sector (Kroetz et al 2019;Kroetz et al 2017).…”

Evaluation of the Chilean Jack Mackerel ITQ System

“…When this transaction required multiple vessels, the system operated similar to permit-stacking regimes that have been used in other fisheries around the world (e.g., the West Coast Sablefish tiered permit staking program(Kroetz and Sanchirico 2009)). …”