Distributed algorithm for resource allocation problems under persistent attacks

Shao, Guangru; Wang, Rui; Wang, Xuefang; Liu, Kun‐Zhi

doi:10.1016/j.jfranklin.2020.04.004

Cited by 16 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Next, we will analyze the stability of the hybrid system (21). To do this, we construct the following Lyapunov function…”

Section: Stability Analysis Of the Proposed Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since the trajectory 𝜉(t, j) of the hybrid system (21) can characterize the solution of the switched algorithm (6), from (28), we can show that (6) can exponentially converge to the set  1 . Furthermore, under the variable change v = ȳ + 1 N ⊗ 𝜔(x), the algorithm (3) is transformed into (6).…”

Section: Stability Analysis Of the Proposed Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When the network is subject to constrained attacks, the paper [23] modeled a switched algorithm and employed hybrid system tools to prove that the optimal solution of the optimization problem can be reached under this algorithm. Following the contributions in Wang et al [23], our previous work [21] considered the distributed resource allocation problem with networked attacks. Though the networked attacks have been considered into some distributed optimization problems, except for the paper of Wang, Sang et al [24], there is little work studying the effect of attacks on distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Following the contributions in Wang et al. [23], our previous work [21] considered the distributed resource allocation problem with networked attacks. Though the networked attacks have been considered into some distributed optimization problems, except for the paper of Wang, Sang et al.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games under networked attacks

Shao

Wang

2021

Asian Journal of Control

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This paper investigates the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem of aggregative games in the presence of networked attacks. A switched algorithm with the fast estimate dynamics is proposed to explore the effect of attacks on seeking a Nash equilibrium. To guarantee the convergence of this algorithm, such a switched strategy is modeled as a hybrid system by using the hybrid automaton and time‐ratio conditions. Then, by constructing an appropriate Lyapunov function, we can prove that the hybrid dynamical system is exponentially stable and the Nash equilibrium can be achieved exponentially though the communication network is affected by attacks. Finally, a Nash–Cournot game is provided to verify the main results.

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“…Next, we will analyze the stability of the hybrid system (21). To do this, we construct the following Lyapunov function…”

Section: Stability Analysis Of the Proposed Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Stability Analysis Of the Proposed Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games under networked attacks

Shao

Wang

2021

Asian Journal of Control

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“…The attacker is stealthy as it will not modify the node's preference information in an arbitrary manner but considers threshold and magnitude constraints during decisionmaking. The considered scenario is related to the resilient resource allocation under adversarial attacks in literature, including jamming attack [6], network topology attack [7], and data falsification attack [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resilient and Distributed Discrete Optimal Transport with Deceptive Adversary: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Hughes

Chen

2021

Preprint

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Optimal transport (OT) is a framework that can be used to guide the optimal allocation of a limited amount of resources. The classical OT paradigm does not consider malicious attacks in its formulation and thus the designed transport plan lacks resiliency to an adversary. To address this concern, we establish an OT framework that explicitly accounts for the adversarial and stealthy manipulation of participating nodes in the network during the transport strategy design. Specifically, we propose a game-theoretic approach to capture the strategic interactions between the transport planner and the deceptive attacker. We analyze the properties of the established two-person zero-sum game thoroughly. We further develop a fully distributed algorithm to compute the optimal resilient transport strategies, and show the convergence of the algorithm to a saddle-point equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the designed algorithm using case studies.

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Resilient algorithm for distributed resource allocation under false data injection attacks

Chen,

Cai,

Gao

et al. 2024

Asian Journal of Control

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For a first‐order nonlinear multi‐agent system who is subject to false data injection (FDI) attacks on agents' actuators and sensors, agents execute a distributed resource allocation algorithm according to the compromised control inputs and interactive information such that the multi‐agent system is unstable and agents' decisions deviate from the optimal resource allocation. At first, we analyze the robustness of the distributed resource allocation algorithm under the FDI attacks. Then, a resilient distributed algorithm is proposed to solve the distributed resource allocation problem by resisting the adverse effect of the attacks. In detail, the unknown nonlinear term and the false data injected in agents are considered as extended states that can be estimated by extended state observers. The estimation is used in the feedback control to suppress the effect of the FDI attacks. As a result, the designed resilient algorithm ensures that agents' decisions converge to the optimal allocation without requiring any information about the nature of the attacks. An example is given to illustrate the results.

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Distributed algorithm for resource allocation problems under persistent attacks

Cited by 16 publications

References 24 publications

Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games under networked attacks

Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games under networked attacks

Resilient and Distributed Discrete Optimal Transport with Deceptive Adversary: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Resilient algorithm for distributed resource allocation under false data injection attacks

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