Distinguo: The response to equivocation

Abstract

Logical guarantees of validity must be understood as subject to the proviso that no equivocation is committed. But we do not have a formal theory of equivocation. This paper attempts to formulate rules for responding to equivocal arguments in the context of dialogue. What occurs when one distinguishes meanings of an equivocal expression turns out to be rather different from definition.

From Speech Acts to Semantics

“…Participants in dialogue need a kind of speech act with which to call an interlocutor to account for what appears to be an immediate inconsistency, and to which (in the first instance) the other must reply by withdrawing one or other of the set of immediately inconsistent statements. Subsequently replies which adopt other strategies may be explored: for example, removing the immediate inconsistency by pointing to an equivocation (Mackenzie, 1988). But as Lewis Carroll drew to our attention, it is not sufficient just to remove inconsistencies.…”

Criticism in Need of Clarification

“…I make a distinction between a moral and a legal sense of the expression obligatory." In this way, the participants improve upon their own language by introducing more precise expressions if the need for more precision arises (Mackenzie 1988). Unlike Mackenzie, who allows the critic to disambiguate the interlocutor's reasoning, I would propose extending a basic critical discussion in such a way that it is up to the opponent to charge the proponent with equivocation, and up to the proponent to repair this flaw by choosing a disambiguation (van Laar 2010).…”

Ambiguity in argument

“…In this way, a stricter model of persuasion dialogue, which precludes the parties from employing actively ambiguous expressions, is embedded in a looser model of persuasion dialogue that does not make it impossible for the parties to use such expressions (intentionally or by accident) but instead, enables them to raise the issue of ambiguity and to improve upon their language if they consider it necessary (cf. Mackenzie (1988Mackenzie ( , 1990) for a similar solution to the problem of modelling rule violations.) Consequently, by adopting a model that strikes a balance between normative bite and tolerance of imperfections, it is possible to commit oneself to the ideal of a language that is free of active ambiguities, while adopting an appropriate measure of realism, leniency and flexibility.…”

“…himself understood it, he had not. Expressions that are ambiguous in ways that hinder argumentative discussion by inciting misunderstanding (Naess 1953(Naess , 1966Grootendorst 1992, 2004) or by masking argumentative weaknesses (cf., on equivocation, Mackenzie 1988Mackenzie , 1990Walton 1996) will be referred to in this paper as actively ambiguous. Two issues will be examined.…”