This paper attempts to systematically characterize critical reactions in argumentative discourse, such as objections, critical questions, rebuttals, refutations, counterarguments, and fallacy charges, in order to contribute to the dialogical approach to argumentation. We shall make use of four parameters to characterize distinct types of critical reaction. First, a critical reaction has a focus, for example on the standpoint, or on another part of an argument. Second, critical reactions appeal to some kind of norm, argumentative or other. Third, they each have a particular illocutionary force, which may include that of giving strategic advice to the other. Fourth, a critical reaction occurs at a particular level of dialogue (the ground level or some meta-level). The concepts here developed shall be applied to discussions of critical reactions by Aristotle and by some contemporary authors.
Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of interest but also to settle differences of opinion. Discussants who are unable to resolve their difference about the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may be willing to abandon their attempts to convince the other and search instead for a compromise that would, for each of them, though only a second choice yet be preferable to a lasting conflict. Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into negotiations and when would this be unwarranted or even fallacious? Second, what is the nature of a compromise? What does it mean to settle instead of resolve a difference of opinion, and what might be the dialectical consequences of mistaking a compromise for a substantial resolution? Our main aim is to contribute to the theory of argumentation within the context of negotiation and compromise formation and to show how arguing disputants can shift to negotiation in a dialectically virtuous way.
ABSTRACT:Some critical reactions hardly give clues to the arguer as to how to respond to them convincingly.Other critical reactions convey some or even all of the considerations that make the critic critical of the arguer's position and direct the arguer to defuse or to at least contend with them. First, an explication of the notion of a critical reaction will be provided, zooming in on the degree of "directiveness" that a critical reaction displays. Second, it will be examined whether there are normative requirements that enhance the directiveness of criticism. Does the opponent have in circumstances a dialectical obligation to provide clarifications, explanations, or even arguments? In this paper, it is hypothesized that the competitiveness inherent in critical discussion must be mitigated by making the opponent responsible for providing her counterconsiderations, if available, thus assisting the proponent in developing an argumentative strategy that defuses them.
The purpose of this paper is to show the pervasive, though often implicit, role of arguments in negotiation dialogue. This holds even for negotiations that start from a difference of interest such as mere bargaining through offers and counteroffers. But it certainly holds for negotiations that try to settle a difference of opinion on policy issues. It will be demonstrated how a series of offers and counteroffers in a negotiation dialogue contains a reconstructible series of implicit persuasion dialogues. The paper is a sequel to van Laar and Krabbe (2017), in which we showed that for some differences of opinion it may be reasonable to shift from persuasion dialogue, aimed at a resolution of the difference on the merits, to negotiation dialogue, aimed at compromise, whereas in the present paper we show that such a shift need not amount to the abandonment of argumentation. Our main aim in this paper as well as in the previous one is to contribute to the theory of argumentation within the context of negotiation and compromise formation.
The distinction between constitutive and regulative rules is applied to rules for critical discussion that have to do with the use of ambiguous expressions. This leads to a distinction between rule violating fallacies, by which one abandons a critical discussion, and norm violating fallacies, which are in a way admissible within a critical discussion. According to the formal model for critical discussion, proposed in this paper, fallacies of the norm violating type arc not prohibited. Instead, it provides discussants with devices to discuss fallacies and fallacy criticisms.Resume: On applique la distinction entre des regles constitutives et regulatives aux regles d'une discussion critique qui se rapporte it I'usage d'expressions ambigues. Ceci mene it une distinction entre les sophismes qui contreviennent a des regles, dont la transgression entralne la fin d'une discussion critique. et des sophismes qui contreviennent it des normes, dont la transgression est d'une certaine fayon acceptable dans un diseours critique. Selon Ie modele formel d'une discussion critique qu'on propose, les transgressions sophistiques des normes sont recevables. D'ailleurs, ce modele donne aux interlocuteurs des moyens de discuter des sophismes et des critiques de ceux-ci.
We shall investigate the similarities and dissimilarities between old and new dialectic. For the ‘old dialectic’, we base our survey mainly on Aristotle’s Topics and Sophistical Refutations, whereas for the ‘new dialectic’, we turn to contemporary views on dialogical interaction, such as can, for the greater part, be found in Walton’s The New Dialectic. Three issues are taken up: types of dialogue, fallacies, and strategies. Though one should not belittle the differences in scope and outlook that obtain between the old and the new dialectic, the paper will show that in many respects the old dialectic foreshadows the new dialectic.
Biro and Siegel have raised two objections against the pragmadialectical approach to argumentation. According to the first, the pragmadialectical theory is not genuinely normative. According to the second, the rejection of justificationism by pragma-dialecticians is unwarranted: they reject justificationism unjustly and they are not consistent in accepting some arguments ('justifications') as sound. The first objection is based on what we regard as the misconception that the goal of resolving differences of opinion cannot provide a normative perspective. In response to the second objection we argue that in pragma-dialectics, the notion of argument, and related notions, are defined in a non-justificatory manner.Resumé: Biro et Siegel ont soulevé des objections contre l'approche pragma-dialectique de l'évaluation de l'argumentation. Selon la première objection, la théorie pragmadialectique n'est pas authentiquement normative. Selon la seconde, le rejet du justificationisme par les pragmadialecticiens est injustifié: ils rejettent à tort le justificationisme et ils sont incohérents lorsqu'ils acceptent certains arguments («justifications») comme étant probants. La première objection est fondée sur l'idée fausse que le but de résoudre des différences d'opinion ne peut pas fournir une perspective normative. En réponse à la seconde objection, nous avançons que dans la pragma-dialectique, la notion d'argument ainsi que d'autres notions reliées se définissent de façon nonjustificative.Pragma-Dialectical Response to Objectivist Challenges 123
Contemporary theory of argumentation offers many insights about the ways in which, in the context of a public controversy, arguers should ideally present their arguments and criticize those of their opponents. We also know that in practice not all works out according to the ideal patterns: numerous kinds of derailments (fallacies) are an object of study for argumentation theorists. But how about the use of unfairstrategiesvis-à-vis one’s opponents? What if it is not a matter of occasional derailments but of one party’s systematic refusal to take other parties seriously? What if one party continually forgoes any form of critical testing and instead resorts to threats or blackmail? Can this be countered by the tools of reason? Or should one pay one’s opponent back in the same coin? To gain some grasp of these issues, we describe a number of strategies used in the public controversy about induced earthquakes in Groningen. We check whether these strategies arefair,i.e.balanced, transparent,andtolerant.We also investigate the effects of the choice for a particular kind of strategy. It appears that, in circumstances, choosing a fair strategy may be detrimental for resolving the controversy and choosing an unfair one beneficial. Following up ideas from social psychology and political science, we formulate some guidelines for the choice of strategies. At the end, we stress the importance — especially for those whose opinions carry little weight — of having a society in which the knowledge and skills needed for assessing the fairness of strategies are widespread.
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