Disputed territory, defensive alliances and conflict initiation

Abstract

In this study, we evaluate the effects of alliance behavior on the probability of militarized conflict initiation with specific emphasis placed on the issues at stake in the conflict. After much debate over the relationship between alliances and conflict, recent research suggests that specific types of alliances, namely defensive pacts for target states, decrease the likelihood that potential challengers will initiate militarized disputes. Revisiting the alliance–conflict relationship, we allow the type of issue at stake to vary in order to determine whether this deterrent effect holds even when the most salient of issues are under contention. Specifically, we introduce indicators for whether the two states are competing over territorial issues, a high-salience stake that is particularly conflict-prone. Using a number of different indicators for territorial competition and examining several different time periods, analyses suggest that targeted defensive alliances do indeed have a deterrent effect against named adversaries, even when the most salient of issues are at stake.

Capability revisited: Ally’s capability and dispute initiation

“…Johnson and Leeds (2011) find that defense pacts deter dispute initiation against member states while defensive alliances do not show any significant effect on dispute initiation or escalation for member states against non-members. Wright and Rider (2014) also show that the deterrence effect of defense pacts holds even when the stakes are high, as in territorial disputes. Benson (2011) is in a similar theoretical vein to Leeds (2003) since he claims that the effects of alliances are determined by what object member states are committed to in an alliance with what level of specificity.…”

Power, territory, and interstate conflict

“…This study makes important contributions to at least two distinct literatures. First, there is a growing literature examining the contextual factors that make territorial disputes more likely to escalate to militarized conflict and war (Dreyer, 2010; Ghatak et al, 2016; Lektzian et al, 2010; Wright and Rider, 2014). Dyadic attributes like alliances, rivalry and joint regime type, among others have been shown to condition the effect that territory has on MIDs.…”

“…Like Wright and Rider (2014), the measure constructed here for capturing the distribution of military capabilities is the strength of the potential challenger divided by the sum of the capabilities in the dyad. The variable ranges between 0 and 1, with lower values indicating a dyad where the target is stronger than the potential challenger and higher values indicating that the potential challenger is stronger than the potential target.…”

“…The fact that only the unconditional effect of military capabilities has been theorized on and empirically tested is surprising given the growing literature looking at whether the effect of territory on conflict conditions or is conditioned by the effect of other variables on conflict (see e.g. Colaresi and Thompson, 2005; Dreyer, 2010; Lektzian et al, 2010; Park and James, 2015; Senese, 2005; Vasquez, 2001; 2004; Wright and Rider, 2014). In this special issue Ghatak et al (2016) also highlight the conditioning role that territory has on the democratic peace.…”

Western Theory of International Military Alliances

“…На протяжении 2000-2010-х годов ряд исследований, построенных на количест-венном исследовании обширных эмпири-ческих данных, с разной степенью уверен-ности подтверждали, что оборонительные альянсы снижают вероятность конфликта и обеспечивают эффективное сдерживание агрессоров Wright, Rider 2014;. Использование в этих исследовани-ях различных моделей и методик анализа повышает доверие к выводам приводимых публикаций.…”