Dismissive Incomprehension: A Use of Purported Ignorance to Undermine Others

Abstract

This paper analyses a particular social phenomenon whereby a speaker purports ignorance of the meaning of another speaker's speech in order to undermine that other speaker: dismissive incomprehension. It develops a speech act theory of the phenomenon, and develops its distinctive, and sometimes problematic perlocutionary character. After taking a look at some of the issues surrounding the phenomenon, the paper compares it to more fully studied features of our social lives, including epistemic injustice and gaslighting. It ends with some thoughts on counteracting the problematic cases of dismissive incomprehension.

Harm Hypervigilance in Public Reactions to Scientific Evidence

“…We also observed that people more offended by scientific findings reported greater difficulty understanding them. This finding may relate to the philosophical concept of “dismissive incomprehension,” the tendency to deflect dissonant claims by characterizing them as incomprehensible (Cull, 2019). Our results were only correlational, so future research should explore the causal direction to test whether this is a motivated tendency (i.e., claiming incomprehensibility to undermine undesirable findings) or whether this pattern just reflects a struggle to reconcile unexpected findings with one’s current understanding of the world.…”

Trans Epistemology and Methodological Radicalism: Un Œuf, But Enough

“…That said, even if for the wrong reasons, I think that Radi is right to reject the second account he proposes, which defines trans epistemology in terms of its practitioners. Why should we think that, for instance, Veronica Ivy's work on the norms of assertion and aesthetic testimony (e.g., Ivy 2015Ivy , 2016, or my own work on dismissive incomprehension and assertion (e.g., Cull 2019aCull , 2019b, count as trans epistemology, just because it is written by trans people? Neither I nor Ivy bring up trans identities or interests as particularly salient features of our work on these topics, but under the second definition of trans epistemology, our work on these topics would count.…”

Themes from Testimonial Injustice and Trust: Introduction to the Special Issue

“…However, hearers can also actively (hence, culpably) and explicitly display supposed incomprehension of the meaning of a speaker's words, 'in order to dismiss that speech and the agent who made that speech' (Cull 2019; see also Dotson 2012 on 'contributory injustice').…”