Disentangling populism and nationalism as discourses of foreign policy: the case of Greek foreign policy during the Eurozone crisis 2010-19

Abstract

Populism and nationalism are often grouped together as phenomena challenging international cooperation. This article argues that, despite these similarities, international relations and foreign policy scholarship can and should distinguish analytically between them. Populism and nationalism differ in how they visualise and articulate the boundaries of the political community and its relationship with political authority. Also, populism can be distinguished from nationalism in that the political community it discursively constructs and mobilises is temporally and territorially particularistic, holding different interests from those of the historically universal nation. These differences imply that populism and nationalism express themselves in distinct, although often overlapping, discourses in foreign policy. The article develops a typology of foreign policy discourses created by the intertwining of populism and nationalism and applies it to an analysis of Greek foreign policy during the decade of the Eurozone crisis (2010–19).

Natural allies? Varieties of attitudes towards the United States and Russia within the French and German radical right

“…Yet building on De Cleen's distinction, both Chryssogelos (2022) and Jenne (2021) focusing on the implication of populism for foreign policy have used case studies to highlight that populism projected into the international sphere prompts opposition to international as well as domestic elites. Jenne argues that in foreign policy, ‘nationalism by itself is likely to yield more limited foreign policy revisionism than nationalism combined with populism’.…”

“…As Varga and Buzogany argue, the global new right and its international agenda is not monolithic, with divergences over the boundaries of transnational and civilisational kinship ties. Meanwhile Chryssogelos usefully highlights that both nationalist and populist discourses can be present in party political agendas to varying degrees (Chryssogelos, 2022: 6). These insights prompt us to look for variations of perspectives on orientation towards great powers and international order not only between radical right parties but also within them.…”

“…Taking seriously the analytical distinction between populist and nationalist ideology (Bonikowski et al, 2019; De Cleen, 2017; Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2019), it is increasingly recognised that the populist ‘anti‐elite’ dimension of these parties' ideologies has an international dimension of its own: a belief that national elites are reinforced by a global liberal elite with a malign agenda to draw sovereignty away from national communities (Cadier & Lequesne, 2020; Chryssogelos, 2017; Destradi et al, 2021; Verbeek & Zaslove, 2017). This prompts ‘systemic revisionism’—a programme to ‘claw back sovereignty from domestic and foreign elites’ (Jenne, 2021; see also Chryssogelos, 2022). This partly explains why populists left and right generally exhibit hostility towards US hegemony, associated with globalising neoliberalism, and warmth towards Putin's Russia.…”