Disclosure Quality, Institutional Investors, and Stock Return Volatility

Influence of disclosure and governance on risk of US financial services firms following Sarbanes-Oxley

“…Higher risk with strong disclosure and governance Lang and Lundholm (1993) and Bushee and Noe (2000) find that greater return volatility is associated with higher quality disclosure, due to attempts by managers to reduce information asymmetry and due to institutional investors 1 Akhigbe and Whyte (2004) and Mamun et al (2005), however, empirically find that market risk was reduced following the passage of GLBA. Mamun et al (2005) argue that the reduction in market risk occurred because the GLBA legislation was successful in containing the incremental risk and created diversification opportunities.…”

An empirical evaluation of analysts’ herding behavior following Regulation Fair Disclosure

“…For instance, Tasker (1998) and Bushee and Noe (2000) found that firms with greater analyst following and greater institutional ownership were less likely to have conference calls that provide open access to all investors. Core (2001) reported evidence consistent with the intuition that informed investors preferred less disclosure, and that analysts and institutions produced information that reduced information asymmetry and the need for conference calls.…”

Value Relevance vis-à-vis Disclosure on Business Combinations and Goodwill Recognized by Publicly Traded Brazilian Companies

“…Along this same line of research, Bushee and Noe (1999) concluded that investors tend to be attracted to companies with greater levels of disclosure.…”