Disasters and the dynamics of interstate rivalry

Abstract

This article examines how disasters influence conflict dynamics in interstate rivalries. Building on insights from the disaster, rivalry, and diversionary conflict literatures, the authors argue that disasters act as political shocks that disrupt a rivalry relationship. Hostility levels in rivalries are stable over time and shift only through major shocks. While the rivalry literature suggests that some shocks may lead to peace, the authors argue that disaster shocks are more likely to be associated with increased conflict. Disasters often strain the state’s capacity to provide security for its people, while leaders who fail to prepare or respond can face domestic costs. To avoid potential removal from office, leaders have incentives to divert the public’s attention away from poor disaster response by adopting a more aggressive foreign policy. The authors hypothesize that the time between militarized disputes is shortened when pairs of states experience rapid onset disasters. However, the conditions for diversionary conflict depend on the degree of intrastate turmoil and the number of interstate rivalries, with disaster diversionary conflict happening most frequently in rivalry dyads with significant internal strife and multiple rivalries. Duration model analyses from 1900 to 2010 provide strong support for the theory and highlight the limits of disaster diplomacy in rivalry contexts. Given the increased frequency and severity of disasters globally, the findings suggest that environmental shocks are likely to increase interstate hostilities in conflict-prone regions.

Connecting international and domestic dots: how conflict entanglement informs resolution and escalation

“…Research has sought to understand the specific conditions under which diversionary wars are likely to take place. This literature, as well as other bodies of literature considering the relationship between the two types of conflicts, have sought to fine-tune existing arguments by introducing additional variables that could explain the conditions under which domestic and international conflicts indeed affect each other (Wilkenfeld, 1973; Hoole and Huang, 1989; Reeder, 2014; Enterline and Gleditsch, 2000; McLaughlin Mitchell and Prins, 2004; Foster, 2006; McLaughlin Mitchell and Thyne, 2010; Lee et al , 2022). For example, evidence suggests that democratic states are much more likely to launch diversionary wars because authoritarian regimes can easily use repression to resolve domestic threats.…”

Triangles, Major Powers, and Rivalry Duration

“…They specify four types of political shocks: shift in threat perception, change in regime orientation/strategies, change in competitive ability, and domestic resource crises. Recently, disasters are also treated as political shocks influencing interstate rivalries (Akcinaroglu et al 2011; Lee et al 2022). Those political shocks are considered as a necessary, not sufficient condition for rivalry termination/de-escalation.…”

Women’s Support Shaken: A Study of Women’s Political Trust after Natural Disasters

“… 3. There is a counterargument in the literature that natural disasters may cause a “rally around the flag” effect, and when disasters strike, regardless of government response, citizens will respond with support and unify around the threat. However, Lee et al (2022) find that leaders have incentives to divert the public’s attention away from poor disaster response by adopting more aggressive foreign policy. This demonstrates that governments create other areas for citizens to focus on instead of disaster, and they do not “rally” around the disaster that is happening. …”