Digital sovereignty and taking back control: from regulatory capitalism to regulatory mercantilism in EU cybersecurity

In Search of Digital Sovereignty and Strategic Autonomy: Normative Power Europe to the Test of Its Geopolitical Ambitions

“…As an example of an effort to bolster European strategic autonomy, Borrell pointed to the launch of the European Raw Materials Alliance (ERMA) in 2020, which helps companies and government secure access to critical materials such as rare earth elements, crucial for technology manufacturing. Such efforts to reduce dependency on external providers and manufacturers and secure technology supply chains have meant that the concept of strategic autonomy has also percolated into the digital debate (Pohle 2020, p. 12; Farrand and Carrapico 2022; Soare forthcoming).…”

“…By using the terms strategic autonomy and technological sovereignty, the EU is trying to position itself as a more self‐assured third actor (Farrand and Carrapico 2022; Monsees and Lambach 2022). In announcing the EU's new trade strategy, intended to support its digital transformation, Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis cautioned that the EU was ‘pursuing a course that is open, strategic and assertive, emphasising the EU's ability to make its own choices and shape the world around it …’ (European Commission 2021a).…”

“…In spite of EU denial of charges of protectionism (Merkel et al 2021), the key concepts falling under the wider category of digital sovereignty indicate a decisive shift in EU thinking from its traditional defence of multilateralism towards clear expressions of self‐interest and geopolitical positioning vis‐à‐vis China and the United States in the areas of technology, trade and investment (Farrand and Carrapico 2022). Spurred by the ‘fundamentally asymmetrical nature of [economic] interdependence’ and concerns that ‘the weight of Europe in the world is shrinking’, EU policymakers are resolute in securing what they see as the bloc's ‘political survival’, even if these actions jar with the EU's championing of free trade and risk irritating traditional allies (Borell 2020).…”

From Market Liberalism to Public Intervention: Digital Sovereignty and Changing European Union Digital Single Market Governance

“…According to Lambach and Oppermann (2022, p. 1), this ambiguity should be understood ‘not as a bug, but a feature’, because it allows diverse actors to attribute different meanings to it and political actors to promote different policy objectives. For example, Farrand and Carrapico (2022) report a move towards a ‘neo‐mercantilist’ regulatory phase in which more interventionist policies in cybersecurity ensure the EU's digital sovereignty against foreign powers and the non‐EU private sector.…”

“…Their key aim can be defined as to create low prices for customers and to achieve competitiveness (van Apeldoorn, 2002, p. 161). They trust private actors in competitive markets more than other forms of organisation, so that private actors are strategically included in governance processes, as in their role as private plaintiffs to enforce competition policy in the United States (Wigger and Nölke, 2007) and reliance on business to achieve cybersecurity (Farrand and Carrapico, 2022). Neoliberal ideology considers attempts to correct market results to be illegitimate (Amable, 2011), and it promotes policy instruments that are geared to reducing obstacles to free and private market competition.…”