Digest of State Practice

Is there a parliamentary peace? Parliamentary veto power and military interventions from Kosovo to Daesh

“…Thus, a humanitarian motive was the main trigger for air strikes in 2014. At the same time, however, the initial air strikes were justified with a reference to a request from the Iraqi government that had asked for support in its efforts to defend itself against Daesh ( Ruys and Verlinden, 2015 ). Moreover, later extensions of the air strikes against targets in Syria followed a self-defence rationale that was fuelled partly by Daesh’s use of Syrian territory as a base for operations against the Iraqi government, partly by the invocation of (collective) self-defence by the French government after the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015.…”

The Ambivalence of Armed Intervention by Invitation: Caught between Sovereign and Global Interests

“…This situation is even further highlighted by another major invited intervention, initiated in Yemen in early 2015. Following a rebel takeover that had been building for months, 786 Yemen issued a plea for foreign intervention on its territory. 787 A Saudi-led coalition responded in kind, having now intervened in the on-going Yemen Civil War.…”

“…787 A Saudi-led coalition responded in kind, having now intervened in the on-going Yemen Civil War. 788 As noted by commentators, the invitation came from the Yemeni President, a potentially legitimate representative of the host State; 789 however, at that time he had fled from Yemen to Saudi Arabia, a situation reminiscent of the one in Ukraine. 790 Unlike Yanukovych and Ukraine, the intervening States had no trouble with this fact.…”

Weathering the Storm: Legality and Legal Implications of the Saudi-Led Military Intervention in Yemen

“…192 Such third-State support would not be directed at forcefully deciding the outcome of a purely internal fight, but rather at combatting 'one of the most serious threats to international peace and security '. 193 Recent instances of State practice, such as the French intervention in Mali in 2013 (Opération Serval), 194 or the air strikes by a US-led coalition of the willing against 'Islamic State' in Iraq, 195 both of which were requested by the de jure authorities and both of which were generally welcomed, support this view. The former operation was carried out in early 2013 'by the French forces, at the request of the transitional authorities of Mali' aimed exclusively at stopping 'the offensive of terrorist, extremist and armed groups towards the south of Mali' 196 -France indeed insisted that it was not intervening in the conflict between the government in Bamako and the Tuareg rebels of the MLNA, but was only acting against Islamist terrorist groups partly composed of foreign elements.…”

“…202 No discussion arose over the legality of the military operations within Iraqi territory, 203 which was launched pursuant to a request by the Iraqi authorities for 'the United States of America to lead international efforts to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds'. 204 The absence of legal objections may well be inspired by the acceptance, widely shared within the international community, that, rather than qualifying as a domestic insurgent movement, 205 Islamic State undoubtedly constituted a terrorist organization 206 (which moreover operated on a cross-border basis).…”