Different faces of (un)controllability: Control restoration modulates the efficiency of task switching

Abstract

Uncontrollability has been often associated with impaired or rigid cognitive processing. However, perceived stability of uncontrollable events modulated some of these detrimental effects on cognition. We investigated whether the experience of sequential control loss and restoration can enhance cognitive flexibility. We manipulated uncontrollability using a concept formation procedure that entailed either only unsolvable tasks (control deprivation condition), unsolvable tasks followed by solvable ones (control restoration condition) or only solvable tasks (control condition). To assess cognitive flexibility, we used a task-switching procedure that incorporated social categories. In Experiment 1 participants categorized people based on gender or age, and in Experiment 2 and 3 based on gender or social roles. Participants showed more flexibility in control restoration than in control deprivation condition. Additionally, in Experiments 2 and 3 this effect was mainly pronounced in the condition where the task evoked more cognitive conflict. We discuss the motivational underpinnings of unstable experiences of control loss and restoration.

What breeds conspiracy antisemitism? The role of political uncontrollability and uncertainty in the belief in Jewish conspiracy.

“…In this state of mind, people perform poorly in more complex, cognitively demanding tasks, particularly those requiring the detection of rules from a limited number of instances and the development of mental models (e.g., McIntosh, Sędek, Fojas, Brzezicka-Rotkiewicz, & Kofta, 2005; Sędek & Kofta, 1990; von Hecker & Sędek, 1999). Also, control-deprived individuals show depletion of attentional resources in dual-task performance (Kofta & Sędek, 1998) and impaired cognitive control, which is manifested in poor filtering of distractors and decreased cognitive flexibility (Bukowski et al, 2015; Bukowski, de Lemus, Marzecová, Lupiáñez, & Gocłowska, 2019) In consequence, individuals might find it difficult to integrate information into more complex, abstract representations of reality, and might become more likely to look for simplistic explanations, for example, general-purpose conspiracy theories (as exemplified by the conviction in Jewish conspiracy). This idea also resonates with studies by Whitson and Galinsky (2008; see also Landau, Kay, & Whitson, 2015; Ma, Landau, Narayanan, & Kay, 2017), where the authors found that control deprivation makes people resort to crude cognitive heuristics, arousing a general tendency to spontaneously detect illusory patterns (false covariations) ranging from visual perception to social cognition, for example, to illusory correlations on financial markets, superstition, and the formation of conspiracy beliefs.…”

Helplessness experience and intentional (un-)binding: Control deprivation disrupts the implicit sense of agency.

“…Another promising line of future research could address the effects of IB's inhibition after noncontingency on information processing. As already stated, research proved that lengthy exposure to action-outcome noncontingency leads to various signs of cognitive deterioration, including impaired inductive reasoning (Kofta & Se ˛dek, 1998), inhibited generation of mental models in the social domain (von Hecker & Se ˛dek, 1999), worsened attentional processing and cognitive control (Bukowski et al, 2015;Kofta & Se ˛dek, 1998;Ric & Scharnitzky, 2003), and decreased cognitive flexibility (Bukowski et al, 2019). Moreover, some analogous malfunctions are also vivid in reactive depression (e.g., Hertel, 1997;Hertel & Rude, 1991;McIntosh et al, 2005;von Hecker & Se ˛dek, 1999).…”

“…Ric and Scharnitzky (2003) found that the longer the exposure to noncontingent outcomes, the worse the performance on measures of sustained attention. Finally, in the most recent studies showing decreased cognitive flexibility after long-term uncontrollability, no improvement effects after relatively brief uncontrollability were noted (Bukowski, de Lemus, Marzecová, Lupiáñez, & Gocłowska, 2019).…”

What do we manipulate when reminding people of (not) having control? In search of construct validity

“…Another important threat to construct validity is a lack of specificity of the manipulation, meaning that the manipulation might have an impact on a broad range of constructs and not specifically on the target construct. For example, manipulating lack of control can not only lower feelings of personal control, but also increase negative emotions, lower self-esteem, increase anxiety and induce a generalized state of uncertainty (e.g., see Bukowski et al, 2019 ; Sedek & Kofta, 1990 ; Schneider, 2022 ).…”