Die pragmatische Lebenswelttheorie

Thomas Luckmann on the Relation Between Phenomenology and Sociology: A Constructive Critical Assessment

“…To use an expression by Ilja Srubar ( 2007 : 66), in this perspective social reality appears as a “ meaningfully structured plexus of actions ” [ sinnstrukturierten Handlungszusammenhang ]. As Luckmann ( 2007a [2003]: 163; see 1979 : 204; 1983a [1973]: 28) in line with Schutz (see 1962a [1953]: 5) emphasizes, the pre-theoretical interpretations of everyday actors are not a “contingent element” of social reality but, rather, a “constitutive component” thereof.…”

“…When characterizing the specificities of the Schutzian approach, Luckmann follows Ilja Srubar’s ( 2007 ) pragmatic and philosophical-anthropological reading of Schutz’s work . Srubar ( 2007 : 173ff.)…”

“…When characterizing the specificities of the Schutzian approach, Luckmann follows Ilja Srubar’s ( 2007 ) pragmatic and philosophical-anthropological reading of Schutz’s work . Srubar ( 2007 : 173ff.) rightly emphasizes that Schutz progressively distances himself from Husserl’s transcendental approach to phenomenology, and this because of its –alleged– metaphysical, idealist, and solipsistic features.…”

“…Interestingly enough, Srubar ( 2007 : 18, 68) does not operate with Luckmann’s dichotomy between sociological construction and phenomenological constitution. Rather, he opts for using the term “social constitution” [ soziale Konstitution ] in a broad sense to designate all the processes and mechanisms through which the lifeworld obtains its “meaning-structure” and “-order” ( 2007 : 23, 91).…”

“…Interestingly enough, Srubar ( 2007 : 18, 68) does not operate with Luckmann’s dichotomy between sociological construction and phenomenological constitution. Rather, he opts for using the term “social constitution” [ soziale Konstitution ] in a broad sense to designate all the processes and mechanisms through which the lifeworld obtains its “meaning-structure” and “-order” ( 2007 : 23, 91). Against this background, he argues that both Husserl and Schutz provide theories of social constitution, although they differ as to their respective definitions of the “lifeworldly constitution processes,” and this, ultimately, because they pursue different theoretical aims ( 2007 : 18, 68).…”