Dewey and Feminism: The Affective and Relationships in Dewey's Ethics

Abstract

Dewey provides an ethics that is committed to those aspects of experience that have been associated with the "feminine." In addition to an argument against the dewaluation of the affective and of concrete relationships, we also find in Dewey's ethics a thoughtful appreciation of how and why these things are essential to our moral life.

No encalço das mulheres de Chicago: conexões orgânicas e radicais do pragmatismo clássico americano

“…dimensões da nossa personalidade (Pappas, 1993). Por isso, apenas o cuidado inteligente é fundido com outros traços de personalidade não caindo no tipo de cuidado prejudicial que embrutece o crescimento das pessoas cuidadas.…”

ESSAY REVIEW Eros and art: The lessons of Dewey's aesthetics

“…Of course, reasons play a role in this process, but only as part of the process. T he view of the self that follows from this is that of a self-in-context, à relational, interactive, and processional' self , states Garrison (1997: 39) , 470 T. ALEXANDER drawing on the work of Pappas (1993). T he moral for teaching here is that we must transcend the stark limits of either/or thinking for what Garrison calls`the paradoxes of expansive growth' (Garrison 1997: 43).…”

Reconstructing Judgment: Emotion and Moral Judgment

“…“Impartiality” is decidedly not to abstract from all perspectives, as it is sometimes characterized in the (vast) literature on this topic. Nor is impartiality necessarily a “misguided” standard (Young 1987) or immune to “human meanings” (Henderson 1987) or “irrational” (Pappas 1992; Seigfried 1989). But it is also not the standard of “rational” moral judgment.…”

“…Dewey [1932] 1985. See Pappas (1992) on emotion and morality in Dewey, and see Giarelli and Chambliss (1989) on Dewey's moral theory and the Kohlberg‐Gilligan debate.…”

“…I am not arguing for what the exact role of impartiality should be in moral judgment. Pappas (1992, 3) and Seigfried (1989, 67f, 77) suggest that for pragmatists “impartiality” is “irrational” insofar as it demands “putting aside” aspects of experience that might be relevant to making a moral determination. As I have already indicated (note 12), I do not wholly agree with this view.…”