Reconstructing Judgment: Emotion and Moral Judgment

Abstract

A traditional association of judgment with “reason” has drawn upon and reinforced an opposition between reason and emotion. This, in turn, has led to a restricted view of the nature of moral judgment and of the subject as moral agent. The alternative, I suggest, is to abandon the traditional categories and to develop a new theory of judgment. I argue that the theory of judgment developed by Justus Buchler constitutes a robust alternative which does not prejudice the case against emotion. Drawing on this theory I then develop how to conceptualize the ways in which feeling and emotion can be (or be components of) moral judgments.

Conceptualising Meaningful Work as a Fundamental Human Need

“…But our emotions do not simply happen to us, rendering us out of control and unable to exercise freedom of choice (cf. Wallace, 1993). Instead, emotions are susceptible to change in the light of new evaluations and judgements, potentially leading to reassessments of the worthiness of objects: 'Transformation in feeling for oneself is a transformation in judgements about the self' (Gilligan, 1982).…”

On Moral Enterprises, Pragmatism, and Feminist Criminology

“…For Dewey, as explained by K. Wallace (1993), All knowledge is contextual, historically and culturally located and motivated. For Dewey, as explained by K. Wallace (1993), All knowledge is contextual, historically and culturally located and motivated.…”

“…Dewey shared with Charles Sanders Peirce and William James the view that thought occurs because of disturbances of habits or problematic conditions or conflict and is directed to resolving the conflict (therefore instrumental in producing truths). For Dewey, as explained by K. Wallace (1993), All knowledge is contextual, historically and culturally located and motivated. The knower is the whole self, not a disembodied mind; she is a transactional self, an organism engaged in and with a world.…”