Development of dynamic protection against timing channels

Kananizadeh, Shahrzad; Kononenko, Kirill

doi:10.1007/s10207-016-0356-7

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 34 publications

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“…In fact, when these techniques are correctly implemented, they prevent or mitigate stack smashing attacks, execution of return-2-x [7] and return-oriented programming (ROP) [8][9][10][11] attack and code injection, respectively. Other techniques such as Flow Control Integrity [12], SmashClean [13] and Timing Channel Protection [14] have also been proven effective.…”

Section: Related Work On Memory Protection Architecturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

SSPFA: effective stack smashing protection for Android OS

Marco-Gisbert

Ripoll

2019

Int. J. Inf. Secur.

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In this paper, we detail why the stack smashing protector (SSP), one of the most effective techniques to mitigate stack buffer overflow attacks, fails to protect the Android operating system and thus causes a false sense of security that affects all Android devices. We detail weaknesses of existing SSP implementations, revealing that current SSP is not secure. We propose SSPFA, the first effective and practical SSP for Android devices. SSPFA provides security against stack buffer overflows without changing the underlying architecture. SSPFA has been implemented and tested on several real devices showing that it is not intrusive, and it is binary-compatible with Android applications. Extensive empirical validation has been carried out over the proposed solution. Keywords Security • Buffer overflow • Stack smashing protector • Mobile devices • Android • Defenses

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