The 51% attack is a technique which intends to fork a blockchain in order to conduct double-spending. Adversaries controlling more than half of the total hashing power of a network can perform this attack. In a similar way, n confirmation and selfish mining are two attack techniques that comprise a similar strategy to the 51% attack. Due to the immense attacking cost to perform the 51% attack, it was considered very unlikely for a long period. However, in recent times, the attack has befallen at a frequent pace, costing millions of dollars to various cryptocurrencies. The 51% attack strategy varies based upon the adopted consensus mechanism by a particular cryptocurrency, and it enables attackers to double-spend the same crypto-coin, restrict transactions, cancel blocks, and even have full control over the price of a cryptocurrency. A crypto-coin with a low hashing power is always jeopardized by the 51% attack due to the easily attainable hashing. In this paper, we analyze the real impact of the 51% attack, revealing serious weaknesses in consensus protocols that made this attack possible. We discuss the five most advanced protection techniques to prevent this attack and their main limitations. We conclude that in most cases, security techniques fail to provide real protection against the 51% attack because the weaknesses are inherited from the consensus protocols.
Smart contracts are programs that reside within decentralized blockchains and are executed pursuant to triggered instructions. A smart contract acts in a similar way to a traditional agreement but negates the necessity for the involvement of a third party. Smart contracts are capable of initiating their commands automatically, thus eliminating the involvement of a regulatory body. As a consequence of blockchain's immutable feature, smart contracts are developed in a manner that is distinct from traditional software. Once deployed to the blockchain, a smart contract cannot be modified or updated for security patches, thus encouraging developers to implement strong security strategies before deployment in order to avoid potential exploitation at a later time. However, the most recent dreadful attacks and the multifarious existing vulnerabilities which result as a consequence of the absence of security patches have challenged the sustainability of this technology. Attacks such as the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) attack and the Parity Wallet hack have cost millions of dollars simply as a consequence of naïve bugs in the smart contract code. In this paper, we classify blockchain exploitation techniques into 4 categories based on the attack rationale; attacking consensus protocols, bugs in the smart contract, malware running in the operating system, and fraudulent users. We then focus on smart contract vulnerabilities, analyzing the 7 most important attack techniques to determine the real impact on smart contract technology. We reveal that even adopting the 10 most widely used tools to detect smart contract vulnerabilities, these still contain known vulnerabilities, providing a dangerously false sense of security. We conclude the paper with a discussion about recommendations and future research lines to progress towards a secure smart contract solution.
The buffer overflow is still an important problem despite the various protection methods developed and widely used on most systems (Stack-Smashing Protector, ASLR and Non-eXecutable). Most of these techniques rely on keeping secret some key information needed by the attackers to build the exploit. Unfortunately, the architecture of most web servers allows attacker to implement brute force attacks that can be exploited to obtain those secrets by mean of brute force attacks, and eventually break into the server.We propose a modification of the stack-smashing protector (SSP) technique which eliminates brute force attacks against the canary. The technique is not intrusive, and can be applied by just pre-loading a shared library. The overhead is almost negligible.The technique has been tested on several web servers and on a complete GNU/Linux distribution by patching the standard C library. We expect that the strategy presented in this paper will become a standard technique on both desktop and servers. IEEE 12th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications978-0-7695-5043-5/13 $26.00
Systems that are built using low-power computationally-weak devices, which force developers to favor performance over security; which jointly with its high connectivity, continuous and autonomous operation makes those devices specially appealing to attackers. ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) is one of the most effective mitigation techniques against remote code execution attacks, but when it is implemented in a practical system its effectiveness is jeopardized by multiple constraints: the size of the virtual memory space, the potential fragmentation problems, compatibility limitations, etc. As a result, most ASLR implementations (specially in 32-bits) fail to provide the necessary protection. In this paper we propose a taxonomy of all ASLR elements, which categorizes the entropy in three dimensions: (1) how, (2) when and (3) what; and includes novel forms of entropy. Based on this taxonomy we have created, ASLRA, an advanced statistical analysis tool to assess the effectiveness of any ASLR implementation. Our analysis show that all ASLR implementations suffer from several weaknesses, 32-bit systems provide a poor ASLR, and OS X has a broken ASLR in both 32- and 64-bit systems. This is jeopardizing not only servers and end users devices as smartphones but also the whole IoT ecosystem. To overcome all these issues, we present ASLR-NG, a novel ASLR that provides the maximum possible absolute entropy and removes all correlation attacks making ASLR-NG the best solution for both 32- and 64-bit systems. We implemented ASLR-NG in the Linux kernel 4.15. The comparative evaluation shows that ASLR-NG overcomes PaX, Linux and OS X implementations, providing strong protection to prevent attackers from abusing weak ASLRs.
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