Deterring repeat offenders with escalating penalty schedules: a Bayesian approach

Abstract

We model deterrence with costly punishment when criminals have different abilities. Abilities are unobserved by both criminals and the courts. Based on past successes, criminals update their priors on being high-ability criminals. Courts cannot observe a criminal's total past offenses. They do know that criminals with more convictions were undeterred by previous penalties. Thus, they must have had more successes resulting in higher posterior probabilities of being high-ability criminals. Those with fewer convictions include more with lower posterior probabilities of being high-ability. Since they know that they are relatively more likely to be caught, they are deterred with lower penalties.

Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two‐stage Model: Experimental Evidence

“…Additionally, we explore some behavioral features of the decision-making process that are not predicted by the rational decision-making model. We observe greater offense levels when subjects Jellal 2004;Miles and Pyne 2015;Mungan 2010). Another strand of literature justifying escalating penalties focuses on the stigma effect of a criminal conviction, which acts as a supplement to formal criminal penalties in deterring some offenders (Dana 2001;Funk 2004;Miceli and Bucci 2005;Rasmusen 1996).…”

“…For example, Polinsky and Rubinfeld () assume that offenders differ in their propensities to commit socially undesirable acts. Some other models incorporate a learning‐by‐doing effect of crime (Baik and Kim ; Garoupa and Jellal ; Miles and Pyne ; Mungan ). Another strand of literature justifying escalating penalties focuses on the stigma effect of a criminal conviction, which acts as a supplement to formal criminal penalties in deterring some offenders (Dana ; Funk ; Miceli and Bucci ; Rasmusen ).…”

Gambling bank behaviour, incentive mechanism, and sanctions: A two-stage model

“…Eggert et al [20] allow the offender's wealth to differ. Miles and Pyne [37] analyse imperfect deterrence: only some criminals are deterred. Endres and Rundshagen [24] found that due to the final round effect, decreasing as well as escalating penalty schemes can reduce punishment costs (compared to a uniform scheme).…”

Graduated Punishments in Public Good Games

“…However, if law enforcers learn more from past offenses than the criminals themselves, then the optimal punishment for repeat offenders is lower than the one for first‐time offenders . In Miles and Pyne (), a criminal gradually discovers how good he is at it. As a criminal's own perception of this ability depends positively on the number of past convictions, one needs to use an escalating penalty schedule to ensure that expected punishments are sufficiently deterring.…”