Simultaneity complicates the estimation of the causal effect of police on crime. We overcome this obstacle by focusing on a mass layoff of Oregon State Police in February of 2003. Due solely to budget cuts, 35 percent of the roadway troopers were laid off, which dramatically reduced citations. The subsequent decrease in enforcement is associated with a significant increase in injuries and fatalities. The effects are similar using control groups chosen either geographically or through data-driven methods. Our estimates suggest that a highway fatality can be prevented with $309,000 of expenditures on state police. (JEL H76, K42, R41)

No abstract

We conduct laboratory experiments to investigate the effects of deterrence mechanisms under controlled conditions. The effect of the expected cost of punishment of an individual's decision to engage in a proscribed activity and the effect of uncertainty on an individual's decision to commit a violation are very difficult to isolate in field data. We use a roadway speeding framing and find that (a) individuals respond considerably to increases in the expected cost of speeding, (b) uncertainty about the enforcement regime yields a significant reduction in violations committed, and (c) people are much more likely to speed when the punishment regime for which they voted is implemented. Our results have important implications for a behavioral theory of deterrence under uncertainty.Keywords Deterrence . Experiment . Uncertainty . Crime and punishment JEL classifications C91 . D03 . D81 . K42The use of deterrence mechanisms-such as the probability of apprehension, fines, jail sentence length, and legal liability-in preventing proscribed activities is theoretically well understood: increases in the expected cost of committing illegal activities will reduce the amount of crimes committed.

No abstract

No abstract

Explanations for cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games (PD) have generated significant interest. While institutional explanations, such as the role of repeated interactions and communication, have offered considerable explanatory ability, a psychological measure of Theory of the Mind (ToM)-Reading the Mind in the Eyes-of an individual's ability to process social and emotional cognition offers new insights. Using this measure, we examine how ToM explains (un)cooperative behavior in a standard PD game. We find that subjects who have higher ToM are less cooperative in PD games and extract higher payoffs.

No abstract

Numerous empirical studies have documented policing behavior and response to public opinion, social norms, changing laws, neighborhood context and a litany of other subject areas. What is missing from this literature is a general theoretical framework that explains the conflicting goals of properly applying the law and responding to social norms and the consequences of the law. We build a theoretical framework where law enforcement officials care about both reputation and performance. Outside evaluations assess the quality of the decision making of the officers, but can be influenced by strategic challenging of the sanctioning by the suspected violators. We first establish that reputational concerns can distort law enforcement, encouraging either over-enforcement or under-enforcement of the law, depending on the prior beliefs of violations and the observed signal. Introducing strategic challenging by the violator eliminates over-enforcement and allows for an even larger reduction in application of the law by less-skilled officers. Connections to empirical findings of distortions in law enforcement, along with an extension to deterrence are highlighted.