Determinants of Promotions in an Internal Labour Market

Pfeifer, Christian

doi:10.1007/bf03396810

Cited by 14 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Looking at the actual daily working hours, we observe positive effects across all specifications and for both channels of promotions. This result confirms the general findings of an extensive body of literature (e.g., Anger 2008;Pfeifer 2010) showing that promotions are positively associated with working time. The rrrs of 1.14 and 1.17 (Table 3, panel A) seem quite large, but since we examine working hours on a daily basis, an increase by one additional hour of working time is a fairly large treatment.…”

Section: The Signal Of Hours Initial Job Assignment and Formal Educsupporting

confidence: 90%

“…One example is employee attendance, which captures employees' willingness to provide effort and demonstrates workers' dedication. Employee attendance has been tested previously, operationalized by absenteeism, overtime work, unpaid overtime work, actual working hours, and contractual working hours (Anger 2005;Bell/Freeman 2001;Booth/Francesconi/Frank 2003;Bratti/Staffolani 2007;Flabbi/Ichino 2001;Francesconi 2001;Pfeifer 2010). Another example is provided by studies testing the relation between performance ratings and future promotions.…”

Section: Asymmetric Information In Internal Versus External Promotionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, we contribute to the existing literature by using administratively collected data on promotions. While the existing literature primarily uses individual surveys (Anger 2005(Anger , 2008Bell/Freeman 2001), plant-level surveys (Bayo-Moriones/Ortín-Ángel 2006), or personnel data from a single firm (Pfeifer 2010(Pfeifer , 2011, we exploit information from the German Employment Register, which includes information on managerial positions since 2012. The employment register is a highly valid administrative data source, since the reports are mandatory for all employers in Germany.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Asymmetric information in external versus internal promotions

Bossler

Grunau

2019

Empir Econ

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Für Beschäftigte existieren zwei Kanäle um eine Führungsposition zu erreichen: die externe und die interne Beförderung. Anhand der neuaufgelegten deutschen Beschäftigtenstatistik vergleichen wir externe und interne Beförderungen mithilfe eines multinomialen Logit-Modells und unter Kontrolle für die Heterogenität zwischen Arbeitgebern. Wir nehmen an, dass die Charakteristika von Beschäftigten abhängig von ihrer Sichtbarkeit innerhalb von Betrieben und über Betriebe hinweg abweichende Einflüsse ausüben. Wir zeigen, dass die Realarbeitszeit für interne Beförderungen eine bedeutsamere Informationsquelle darstellt als für externe. Demgegenüber spielen formale Ausbildungsabschlüsse und die ursprüngliche Aufgabenkomplexität, welche beide auch über Betriebe hinweg sichtbar sind, eine größere Rolle bei externen Beförderungen. Übereinstimmend mit dem Konzept statistischer Diskriminierung unterliegen Frauen und Ausländer bei externen Beförderungen einem stärker ausgeprägten Nachteil. Bei Frauen ist dieses Ergebnis vollständig auf Beförderungen zu Managern bzw. leitenden Angestellten zurückzuführen, welche durch hohe Aufgabenkomplexität gekennzeichnet sind. Darüber hinaus zeigt die Realarbeitszeit einen starken positiven Interaktionseffekt auf die Beförderungsaussichten von Frauen.

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Section: The Signal Of Hours Initial Job Assignment and Formal Educsupporting

confidence: 90%

Section: Asymmetric Information In Internal Versus External Promotionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Asymmetric information in external versus internal promotions

Bossler

Grunau

2019

Empir Econ

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“…Where multi‐year data were presented, we averaged reliabilities or correlations across consecutive years when the sample size did not change over time. For studies that lost participants owing to attrition (e.g., Pfeifer, ), we did a bare bones meta‐analysis and used the sample size‐weighted effect size with the harmonic mean of the years' sample sizes in our calculations. Also, in the case of experimental interventions, we accommodated pre‐test data but not post‐test data.…”

Section: Methods and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Frequency versus time lost measures of absenteeism: Is the voluntariness distinction an urban legend?

Johns

Hajj

2015

J Organ Behavior

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Summary We investigate a long‐standing methodological rule of thumb, the idea that the frequency of absenteeism from work approximates an expression of voluntary behavior while total time lost better reflects involuntary behavior and ill health. Conducting original meta‐analyses and using results from existing meta‐analyses, we determine that time lost and frequency are equally reliable, that the relationship between them approximates unity when corrections for measurement artifacts are applied, and that there is very little evidence for differential criterion‐related validity predicated on the voluntariness distinction. We supply new meta‐analytic estimates of the reliability of absenteeism adjusted for aggregation period and determine that most extant meta‐analyses of the correlates of absenteeism have markedly under‐corrected for unreliability. Our results question the basic construct validity of the time lost–frequency distinction, and they contradict the practice of using “trigger points” that factor absence frequency into attendance monitoring and associated discipline systems so as to discourage short‐term absenteeism, assumed to be volitional. We conclude that the idea that time lost and frequency reflect different degrees of voluntariness is an unsupported urban research legend. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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“…Due to rising investments in firm-specific human capital, firms do not have to poach employees from other firms within the same sector. Besides, Pfeifer (2010) argues that internal labour markets and promotions serve as an instrument to allocate employees more efficiently. Since firms learn more about employees' abilities and working attitudes, information asymmetries will be reduced, and a better job matching will follow.…”

Section: Institutional Background Theoretical Considerations and Hypmentioning

confidence: 99%

Works councils, quits and dismissals in Germany

Grund

Martin

Schmitt

2016

German Journal of Human Resource Management: Zeitschrift für Pe

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Works Councils, Quits and Dismissals in Germany We examine the relationship between works councils and two different types of employment separation: dismissals by the firm and voluntary quits by employees. Based on representative data from the German SocioEconomic Panel, we find a negative relationship between works councils and both kinds of separation. This is particularly true for skilled blue collar as well as qualified white collar workers compared to employees in other job categories. Additionally, we find first hints for a positive relation between works councils and the relevance of severance payments in the case of dismissals.

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Determinants of Promotions in an Internal Labour Market

Cited by 14 publications

References 30 publications

Asymmetric information in external versus internal promotions

Asymmetric information in external versus internal promotions

Frequency versus time lost measures of absenteeism: Is the voluntariness distinction an urban legend?

Works councils, quits and dismissals in Germany

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