Destabilizing the Error Theory

Cuneo, Terence; Grajner, Martin; Schmechtig, Pedro

doi:10.1515/9783110496765-005

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Now, if a naturalistic realist can plausibly argue for a naturalized functional normativity of morality, then an error theorist cannot argue for a naturalized functional normativity of morality without providing some good reason to hold the moral error theory over naturalistic realism. This is what Cuneo (2016) called the ‘destabilizing result’ of the moral error theory.…”

Section: Problems For Reducing Epistemic Normativitymentioning

confidence: 88%

The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument

Zhou¹,

Borchert²

2023

Philosophy

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Many moral error theorists reject moral realism on the grounds that moral realism implies the existence of categorical normativity, yet categorical normativity does not exist. Call this the Metaphysical Argument. In response, some moral realists have emphasized a parity between moral normativity and epistemic normativity. They argue that if one kind of normativity is rejected, then both must be rejected. Therefore, one cannot be a moral error theorist without also being an epistemic error theorist. Call this the Parity Argument. In this paper, we address three possible responses to the Parity Argument from moral error theorists: (1) accept the parity but still reject epistemic error theory, (2) reject the parity, (3) accept the parity and defend epistemic error theory. We argue that there are problems with each of these responses, so the Parity Argument stands as a strong counterargument to the Metaphysical Argument. We conclude by drawing some lessons for any future challenges to the Parity Argument.

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Section: Problems For Reducing Epistemic Normativitymentioning

confidence: 88%

The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument

Zhou¹,

Borchert²

2023

Philosophy

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“…Olson 2011, 2014. Cuneo (2016 criticises my defence of epistemic error theory and argues, on basis of the Parity Premise, that moral error theory and epistemic error theory are both inherently unstable views.…”

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confidence: 99%

Moral and Epistemic Error Theory

Olson¹

2018

Metaepistemology

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Many moral error theorists hold that moral facts are irreducibly normative. They also hold that irreducible normativity is metaphysically queer and conclude that there are no irreducibly normative reasons and consequently no moral facts. A popular response to moral error theory utilizes the so-called ‘companions in guilt’ strategy and argues that if moral reasons are irreducibly normative, then epistemic reasons are too. This is the Parity Premise, on the basis of which critics of moral error theory draw the Parity Conclusion that if there are no irreducibly normative reasons, there are no moral reasons and no epistemic reasons. From the Parity Conclusion and Epistemic Realism (the view that there are epistemic reasons), it follows that it is false that there are no irreducibly normative reasons. In this chapter, it is argued that the Parity Premise and the Parity Conclusion can both plausibly be rejected.

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Knowledge, Reasons, and Errors About Error Theory

Côté-Bouchard

Littlejohn

2018

Metaepistemology

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Destabilizing the Error Theory

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument

The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument

Moral and Epistemic Error Theory

Knowledge, Reasons, and Errors About Error Theory

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