Moral and Epistemic Error Theory

Abstract

Many moral error theorists hold that moral facts are irreducibly normative. They also hold that irreducible normativity is metaphysically queer and conclude that there are no irreducibly normative reasons and consequently no moral facts. A popular response to moral error theory utilizes the so-called ‘companions in guilt’ strategy and argues that if moral reasons are irreducibly normative, then epistemic reasons are too. This is the Parity Premise, on the basis of which critics of moral error theory draw the Parity Conclusion that if there are no irreducibly normative reasons, there are no moral reasons and no epistemic reasons. From the Parity Conclusion and Epistemic Realism (the view that there are epistemic reasons), it follows that it is false that there are no irreducibly normative reasons. In this chapter, it is argued that the Parity Premise and the Parity Conclusion can both plausibly be rejected.

The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument

“…In his later work (2018), Olson argues for functional reduction . He reduces epistemic normativity to something else other than a desire or a norm of an activity.…”

“…He reduces epistemic normativity to something else other than a desire or a norm of an activity. He proposes a functional view of epistemic normativity; that is, epistemic reasons can be reduced to the function of belief of ‘helping subjects to navigate and explain the world by carrying correct, or largely correct, information’ (2018, p. 115).…”

“…Olson suggests that even though there is no irreducible epistemic normativity, there are still epistemic reasons since epistemic reasons are either reducible to hypothetical reasons or reducible to reasons about correct norms associated with a pertinent role or activity. 10 Later, Olson (2018) explicitly rejects the parity premise, suggesting that epistemic normativity can be reduced to the function of beliefs. Therefore, unlike queer moral normativity which is supposed to be irreducibly normative (Mackie, 1977;Olson, 2014Olson, , 2018, epistemic normativity is not queer.…”

“…First, one could accept the parity between moral and epistemic normativity but reject moral normativity nonetheless (Cowie, 2014(Cowie, , 2019. Second, one could reject the parity between moral and epistemic normativity (Olson, 2011a(Olson, , 2011b(Olson, , 2014(Olson, , 2018. Third, one could accept the parity between moral and epistemic normativity, and embrace scepticism for both (Streumer, 2013(Streumer, , 2017.…”

Conceptions of Epistemic Value

“…In this way, moral realism and epistemic realism run "in parallel." Cuneo's work has generated a lot of work, with some authors defending the parallel (e.g., Bedke (2010), Case (2019), Cuneo and Kyriacou (2018), Das (2016Das ( , 2017, Rowland (2013Rowland ( , 2016) and others criticizing it (e.g., Cowie (2014Cowie ( , 2016, Olson (2018)). 13 Notice that falsity of extended normative pluralism is still consistent with views on which value is "incommensurable."…”